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Christopher Hill

Brown University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    69
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 More details
  • Brown University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (69)
  •  148
    I love Machery’s book, but love concepts more
    Philosophical Studies 149 (3): 411-421. 2010.
    Theories of Concepts, Misc
  •  163
    Harman on self referential thoughts
    Philosophical Issues 16 (1): 346-357. 2006.
    I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. M…Read more
    I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. Moreover, I feel that it is extremely useful. Without deploying it, how could we tell the whole truth about the nature of thoughts?
    Self-Representational Theories of ConsciousnessRepresentationalismFirst-Person Contents
  • The failings of functionalism
    In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
    Functionalism and QualiaAbsent QualiaFunctional Realization
  •  299
    Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory Reasoning
    with Nina Emery
    Analysis 77 (1): 134-148. 2017.
    In this critical notice of Kment's _Modality and Explanatory Reasoning_, we focus on Kment’s arguments for impossible worlds and on a key part of his discussion of the interactions between modality and explanation – the analogy that he draws between scientific and metaphysical explanation.
    Impossible WorldsMetaphysics, Miscellaneous
  •  85
    Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 50-51. 1993.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceFunctionalism and QualiaFunctional Realization
  •  83
    On getting to know others
    Philosophical Topics 13 (2): 257-266. 1985.
    The Problem of Other Minds
  •  1003
    Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem
    Philosophical Studies 87 (1): 61-85. 1997.
    Zombies and the Conceivability ArgumentConceivability, Imagination, and Possibility
  •  50
    Visual awareness and visual qualia
    Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915.
    VisionQualia
  •  201
    Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (review)
    Philosophical Review 122 (3): 511-518. 2013.
    Consciousness and MaterialismRussellian MonismNonreductive MaterialismPhysicalism about the Mind, Mi…Read more
    Consciousness and MaterialismRussellian MonismNonreductive MaterialismPhysicalism about the Mind, MiscRepresentationalism
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