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75Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/BrainPhilosophical Review 97 (4): 573. 1988.
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The failings of functionalismIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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167Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory ReasoningAnalysis 77 (1): 134-148. 2017.In this critical notice of Kment's _Modality and Explanatory Reasoning_, we focus on Kment’s arguments for impossible worlds and on a key part of his discussion of the interactions between modality and explanation – the analogy that he draws between scientific and metaphysical explanation.
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29Remarks on David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.Thinking about Consciousness is a wonderfully clear and vigorous commen- tary on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to brain processes. It advances the contemporary discussion of a number of important issues, but it also introduces several quite valuable ideas that are independent of the con- temporary literature. Papineau has performed an important service by writing it.
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104Précis of Consciousness (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 483-487. 2012.Précis of Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9813-3 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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1Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal spaceIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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166Introspective awareness of sensationsTopoi 7 (March): 11-24. 1988.My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs
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79Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (review)Philosophical Review 122 (3): 511-518. 2013.
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39Supervenience and MaterialismPhilosophical Review 107 (1): 115. 1998.Rowlands is concerned to explain and defend a doctrine about the relationship between mental states and physical states that he calls supervenience materialism. Very roughly speaking, this is the doctrine that it is the possession of physical properties by an object that makes for or determines the possession of mental properties by that object. In explaining this doctrine, Rowlands discusses various questions of interpretation, such as what should be meant by ‘determines’ and by ‘physical prope…Read more
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10Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02912
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31Anti‐individualism: Mind and language, knowledge and justificationPhilosophical Books 50 (2): 112-123. 2009.
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49Review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7). 2008.
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39Peacocke on semantic valuesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1). 1998.This Article does not have an abstract
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71Meaning, Mind, and KnowledgeOxford University Press. 2014.This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge
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50Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915.
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Introspection and the skepticIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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725There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 445-454. 1999.Chalmers’s anti-materialist argument runs as follows
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43Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 50-51. 1993.
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Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itselfIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 249--272. 2006.
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |