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1Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature (review)Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 123-126. 2003.
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45Précis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic CorrespondencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 174-181. 2006.I thank the commentators for their extremely rich and stimulating discussions of Thought and World.1 Their commentaries show that a number of TW’s claims are in need of clarification and defense, and that some of its arguments contain substantial lacunae. I am very pleased to have these flaws called to my attention, and to have an opportunity to try to correct them. Also, I am grateful for the commentators’ endorsements. As is perhaps inevitable in a symposium of this kind, the commentaries cont…Read more
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6Subject, Thought, and Context by Philip Pettit and John McDowell, eds (review)Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 106-112. 1990.
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21RevisionIn Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 134. 2013.
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1Ouch! An essay on painIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
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312Of bats, brains, and mindsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (September): 100-106. 1977.
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Intentionality, folk psychology, and reductionIn Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives On Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988.
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856Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problemPhilosophical Studies 87 (1): 61-85. 1997.
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138Why cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December): 254-65. 1981.
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106
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38Can Carey answer Quine?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 132-133. 2011.In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument
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11Raw Feelings: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Books 37 (2): 127-130. 1996.
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15Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press. pp. 127. 2012.
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56How to study introspectionJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1): 21-43. 2011.In this paper I celebrate the virtues of Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel's path-breaking book on introspection, but I also exp-ress dissatisfaction with a few of its recurring themes. The main body of the paper consists of seven theses about the way in which the study of introspection should be conducted. Thus, to a large extent, the paper is a methodological proposal, though it also makes a number of concrete claims about the nature of introspection, and about the epistemological status of its delive…Read more
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188Sensations: A Defense of Type MaterialismCambridge University Press. 1991.This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theo…Read more
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27Consciousness and the Origins of Thought (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 273-276. 1999.
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358Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 567-581. 1996.
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74Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/BrainPhilosophical Review 97 (4): 573. 1988.
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The failings of functionalismIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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29Remarks on David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.Thinking about Consciousness is a wonderfully clear and vigorous commen- tary on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to brain processes. It advances the contemporary discussion of a number of important issues, but it also introduces several quite valuable ideas that are independent of the con- temporary literature. Papineau has performed an important service by writing it.
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167Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory ReasoningAnalysis 77 (1): 134-148. 2017.In this critical notice of Kment's _Modality and Explanatory Reasoning_, we focus on Kment’s arguments for impossible worlds and on a key part of his discussion of the interactions between modality and explanation – the analogy that he draws between scientific and metaphysical explanation.
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |