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22Causality, Identity, and Supervenience in the Mind-Body ProblemMidwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1): 31-49. 1979.
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24Supervenient Properties and Micro-Based Properties: A reply to NoordhofProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1): 115-118. 1999.Jaegwon Kim; Supervenient Properties and Micro-Based Properties: A reply to Noordhof, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1, 1 June 1999
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193Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd Edition (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2011.Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects.
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7Metaphysics: An Anthology, 1st Edition (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative metaphysics anthologies available - now updated and expanded Offers the most important contemporary works on the central i…Read more
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7Chisholm's legacy on intentionalityMetaphilosophy 34 (5): 649-662. 2003.The problem of intentionality, or how mind and language can take things in the world as “intentional objects,” engaged Chisholm throughout his philosophical career. This essay reviews and discusses his seminal contributions on this problem, from his early work in “Sentences about Believing” and Perceiving during the 1950s to his last and most mature account in The First Person, published in 1981. Chisholm's final view was that de se reference, or a subject's directly taking himself as an intenti…Read more
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14Supervenience, Determination, and ReductionJournal of Philosophy 82 (11): 616. 1985.Abstract of a paper presented in an APA symposium on Supervenience, December 29, 1985.
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4Supervenience and nomological incommensurablesIn Michael Tooley (ed.), Laws of nature, causation, and supervenience, Garland. pp. 1--2. 1999.
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22The very idea of token physicalismIn Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press. pp. 167. 2012.
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15Against Laws in the Special SciencesJournal of Philosophical Research 37 (9999): 103-122. 2012.The traditional view of science holds that science is essentially nomothetic—that is, the defining characteristic of science is that it seeks to discover and formulate laws for the phenomena in its domain, and that laws are required for explanation and prediction. This paper advances the thesis that there are no laws in the special sciences, sciences other than fundamental physics, and that this does not impugn their status as sciences. Toward this end, two arguments are presented. The first beg…Read more
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6Responses to comments on Mind in a Physical WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 671-680. 2002.Jackson says that the form of physicalism that I recommend, with certain emendations he believes are necessary, turns out to be none other than the “Australian” type-type identity theory of J.J.C. Smart and others. About this, too, I have no serious disagreement, although Jackson’s claim appears to depend, at least in part, on a certain chosen reading of the texts involved. In fact, one point of similarity may be worth noting. As I take it, one special feature of the “Australian” type identity t…Read more
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45Emergence: Core ideas and issuesSynthese 151 (3): 547-559. 2006.This paper explores the fundamental ideas that have motivated the idea of emergence and the movement of emergentism. The concept of reduction, which lies at the heart of the emergence idea is explicated, and it is shown how the thesis that emergent properties are irreducible gives a unified account of emergence. The paper goes on to discuss two fundamental unresolved issues for emergentism. The first is that of giving a “positive” characterization of emergence; the second is to give a coherent e…Read more
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1The Many Problems of Mental Causation (Excerpt)In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oup Usa. 2002.
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22ResponsesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3). 2002.Jackson says that the form of physicalism that I recommend, with certain emendations he believes are necessary, turns out to be none other than the “Australian” type-type identity theory of J.J.C. Smart and others. About this, too, I have no serious disagreement, although Jackson’s claim appears to depend, at least in part, on a certain chosen reading of the texts involved. In fact, one point of similarity may be worth noting. As I take it, one special feature of the “Australian” type identity t…Read more
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24The layered model: Metaphysical considerationsPhilosophical Explorations 5 (1). 2002.This paper examines the idea, commonly presupposed but seldom explicitly stated in discussions of certain philosophical problems, that the objects and phenomena of the world are structured in a hierarchy of "levels", from the bottom level of microparticles to the levels of cells and biological organisms and then to the levels of creatures with mentality and social groups of such creatures. Parallel to this "layered model" of the natural world is an ordering of the sciences, with physics as our "…Read more
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6Mental Causation in Searle’s “Biological Naturalism”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 189-194. 1995.
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21ReferencesCritical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 18 (1-3): 331-360. 2006.. References. Critical Review: Vol. 18, Democratic Competence, pp. 331-360.
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42Physicalism, or Something Near EnoughPrinceton University Press. 2005."This is a fine volume that clarifies, defends, and moves beyond the views that Kim presented in Mind in a Physical World.
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26Supervenience for Multiple DomainsPhilosophical Topics 16 (1): 129-150. 1988.The main topic of this paper is the question of how supervenience can be understood as a relation between two families of properties each applicable to a distinct domain of individuals.
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1Lonely souls: Causality and substance dualismIn Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons, Cornell University Press. 2001.
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5Psychophysical lawsIn Ernest LePore & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and events: perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 1985.
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28CHAPTER 5. Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don’t WorkIn Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press. pp. 121-148. 2005.
Jaegwon Kim
(1934 - 2019)
Providence, Rhode Island, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |