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Christopher Hitchcock

California Institute of Technology
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  •  Publications
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 More details
  • California Institute of Technology
    Division of Humanities and Social Sciences
    Professor
University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1993
APA Western Division
CV
Homepage
Pasadena, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Theories of Causation
Causal Modeling
Causal Reasoning
Varieties of Causation
Causation
Experimental Philosophy: Causation
Explanation
Theories of Explanation
Explanation in the Sciences
Varieties of Explanation
Formal Epistemology
Probabilistic Reasoning
Probabilistic Puzzles
Sleeping Beauty
Doomsday Argument
Decision Theory
Causal Decision Theory
Newcomb's Problem
Philosophy of Probability
Chance and Objective Probability
Bayesian Reasoning
Probabilistic Principles
17 more
Areas of Interest
Inference to the Best Explanation
Scientific Realism
Subjective Probability
Betting Interpretations and Dutch Books
Conditional Probability
Degrees of Belief
Confirmation
Induction
Direct Inference Principles
Probability in the Physical Sciences
Applications of Probability
Simplicity and Parsimony
Historical Linguistics
David Lewis
Intuition
Formal Social Epistemology
Epistemology of Disagreement
Epistemology of Testimony
Philosophical Methods
Conceptual Analysis
Inductive Logic
Judgment Aggregation
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Mathematics
Philosophy of Physical Science
Psychology
Mathematics
Statistics
24 more
  • All publications (95)
  •  240
    Contemporary debates in philosophy of science (edited book)
    Blackwell. 2004.
    Showcasing original arguments for well-defined positions, as well as clear and concise statements of sophisticated philosophical views, this volume is an ...
    Causation by AbsencesProcess Theories of CausationGeneral Philosophy of Science, MiscModularity in C…Read more
    Causation by AbsencesProcess Theories of CausationGeneral Philosophy of Science, MiscModularity in Cognitive ScienceEvolutionary Biology
  •  81
    Asymmetry and Overdetermination in Swain's Counterfactual Theory of Causation
    Auslegung 18 17-25. 1992.
    Causal OverdeterminationCounterfactual Theories of Causation
  •  404
    Three concepts of causation
    Philosophy Compass 2 (3). 2007.
    I distinguish three different concepts of causation: The scientific concept, or causal structure, is the subject of recent work in causal modeling. The folk attributive concept has been studied by philosophers of law and social psychologists. The metaphysical concept is the one that metaphysicians have attempted to analyze. I explore the relationships between these three concepts, and suggest that the metaphysical concept is an untenable and dispensable mixture of the other two.
    Theories of Causation
  •  406
    No one knows the date or the hour: An unorthodox application of rev. Bayes's theorem
    with Paul Bartha
    Philosophy of Science 66 (3): 353. 1999.
    Carter and Leslie (1996) have argued, using Bayes's theorem, that our being alive now supports the hypothesis of an early 'Doomsday'. Unlike some critics (Eckhardt 1997), we accept their argument in part: given that we exist, our existence now indeed favors 'Doom sooner' over 'Doom later'. The very fact of our existence, however, favors 'Doom later'. In simple cases, a hypothetical approach to the problem of 'old evidence' shows that these two effects cancel out: our existence now yields no info…Read more
    Carter and Leslie (1996) have argued, using Bayes's theorem, that our being alive now supports the hypothesis of an early 'Doomsday'. Unlike some critics (Eckhardt 1997), we accept their argument in part: given that we exist, our existence now indeed favors 'Doom sooner' over 'Doom later'. The very fact of our existence, however, favors 'Doom later'. In simple cases, a hypothetical approach to the problem of 'old evidence' shows that these two effects cancel out: our existence now yields no information about the coming of Doom. More complex cases suggest a move from countably additive to non-standard probability measures.
    Doomsday ArgumentBayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  697
    Prevention, preemption, and the principle of sufficient reason
    Philosophical Review 116 (4): 495-532. 2007.
    Counterfactual Theories of CausationCausal Modeling
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