Simon Blackburn

哲學作家朱家安、哲學研究者邱振訓、哲學系副教授許漢愛智推薦！ 英國劍橋大學著名哲學教授賽門‧布雷克本 教你這樣探索人生的20個大問題！ 他在一連串彼此相關的問題與論證中推敲、從前人的思路中借鏡 縱橫解析偉大思想家們思考的來龍去脈 主題深刻，內容精闢，是了解自己、了解世界的經典之作 「你幹嘛要想這些奇怪的問題呢？」 「它們看起來根本就沒有答案啊！」 當代知名哲學家賽門‧布雷克本教授在《這一切究竟是為什麼：20個哲學大哉問》這本書裡，幫助你迅速釐清每個主題的「哲學戰況」： 目前最重要的問題是什麼？ 有哪些當紅的立場？ 主要是誰跟誰對上？ 各自有哪些難解的任務？ 不但可以讓你少走冤枉路， 也可以誘引你跟隨、批判，並發展自己的獨到見解。 作者賽門‧布雷克本所列舉的20個題目，是無論男女老幼都會經常感到困惑的問題。就算不依靠反省能力，這些問題似乎也會自然迸生出來，而我們都想找到這些問題的解答。 《這一切究竟是為什麼》一書所羅列的20個問題沒有按一定順序編排，只有最後一個問題例外，因為那是我們所有人最終都會面臨的問題。每個問題的相關討論都是各自獨立的，所以讀者可以挑自己感興趣的主題來看。不過，有時候不同的問題討論難免會涉及彼此，因此讀者可能會需要前後對照。 所有題目都沒有「標準」答案，但是大家都能從作者的思路、思考的角度來省思我們實際上如何思考、如何感受，以及我們應該如何思考與感受。 ※ 愛智推薦 或許你會忽然覺得「我幹嘛想這些奇怪的問題？」於是轉頭就走不再回來；或許你會覺得這些問題有點有趣，甚至找到志同道合的人一起討論。不管你是哪種人，這本書都能提供一些有趣的幫助。 ──哲學作家 朱家安 哲學思考實在不是為了什麼額外好處才要進行的活動，就像是「美」、「健康」、「正義」一樣，本身就是具有獨立內在價值的事。亞里斯多德說哲學起源於驚嘆，想來約是此意。 ──哲學研究者 邱振訓 這本書並不容易閱讀，讀者多少會感覺到布雷克本的思考或行文脈絡不容易完全掌握，有時引述討論某個哲學家或科學家或文學家的說法，有時是對流行意見的觀察，有時是他自己的看法，這些不同說法交雜在他的思考與討論中……哲學問題是反思性的，讀者需要夠努力去思考才能掌握或品味其中的趣味。 ──國立中正大學哲學系副教授 許漢.

Although Broad published many books in his lifetime, this volume is unique in presenting some of his most interesting unpublished writings. Divided into five clear sections, the following figures and topics are covered: Autobiography, Hegel and the nature of philosophy, Francis Bacon, Hume's philosophy of the self and belief, F. H. Bradley, The historical development of scientific thought from Pythagoras to Newton, Causation, Change and continuity, Quantitative methods, Poltergeists, Paranormal phenomena. Each section is introduced and placed in context by the editor, Joel Walmsley. The volume also includes an engaging and informative foreword by Simon Blackburn. It will be of great value to those studying and researching the history of twentieth-century philosophy, metaphysics, and the recent history and philosophy of science, as well as anyone interested in Broad's philosophical thought and his place in the history of philosophy.

It is not difficult to find both affinities and divergences in the work of Wittgenstein and Brandom but this particular text explores several key issues beyond first impressions and reveals hidden divergences in supposed similarities and occasionally less profound dissimilarities where their philosophies seem to differ radically. Both Wittgenstein and Brandom, while agreeing that representations cannot be taken to be primitive, would not approve of Rorty’s drive to jettison the very idea of representation along with that of truth. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, “is averse to any attempt at general, explanatory, theories of how language works” while “Brandom is much more positive about the possibility of general, systematic and explanatory theories of meaning.” The divergence about the builders of Philosophical Investigations § 2 and their language use is traced back to Wittgenstein’s being essentially a worldly pragmatist, while Brandom's practice is essentially intralinguistic. In the second part, the text takes issue with Brandom's theory of making explicit, and in the final sections, the paper questions the supposed contrast between expressivism and the “motley of language” and takes a look at Brandom's strive for a normative realism that distinguishes him from other expressivists.

This chapter is an expanded version of a review of Frank Jackson's _From Metaphysics to Ethics_ that the author wrote for the _Australasian Journal of Philosophy_. It attempts to sketch the essence of Jackson's approach to metaphysics and ethics, and to indicate some of the places where it is surprising and, inevitably, controversial. It focuses on the ‘analytic descriptivism’, or the ‘a priori passage principle’ that Jackson stands by, generating ‘the view that for each true statement concerning our world, there is a statement in physical terms that a priori entails that statement’ (Jackson 2003).

In this article I argue that we do not need a strict definition of naturalism, but can satisfactorily describe the naturalistic stance or attitude in terms of hostility to seeing human beings as subject to powers or forces or laws of nature that go beyond those governing the rest of the empirical world. We are to be explained as the evolutionary products of natural processes. I argue that we should see our concepts as well in this light, and explore some examples of the way this attitude can illuminate questions of meaning.

Art is the one corner of human life in which we may take our ease. To justify our presence there the only thing that is demanded of us is a passion for representation. In other places our passions are conditional and embarrassed; we are allowed to have only so many as are consistent with those of our neighbours; with their convenience and well-being, with their convictions and prejudices, rules and regulations. Art means an escape from all this. Wherever her brilliant standard floats the need for apologies and exonerations is over; there it is enough simply that we please or that we are pleased. There, the tree is judged only by its fruits. If these are sweet, one is welcome to pluck them.1.