Cambridge, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
  • Ruling Passions
    Philosophy 75 (293): 454-458. 1998.
  •  3
    Essays on Quasi-Realism
    Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186): 96-99. 1997.
  •  111
    The Oxford dictionary of philosophy
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    This bestselling dictionary is written by one of the leading philosophers of our time, and it is widely recognized as the best dictionary of its kind. Comprehensive and authoritative, it covers every aspect of philosophy from Aristotle to Zen. With clear and concise definitions, it provides lively and accessible coverage of not only Western philosophical traditions, but also themes from Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and Jewish philosophy. New entries on philosophy of economics, social theory, neuros…Read more
  •  79
  •  313
    (2000). Critical notice of Frank Jackson, from metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 119-124. doi: 10.1080/00048400012349401.
  •  674
    Think: a compelling introduction to philosophy
    Oxford University Press. 1999.
    Here at last is a coherent, unintimidating introduction to the challenging and fascinating landscape of Western philosophy. Written expressly for "anyone who believes there are big questions out there, but does not know how to approach them," Think provides a sound framework for exploring the most basic themes of philosophy, and for understanding how major philosophers have tackled the questions that have pressed themselves most forcefully on human consciousness. Simon Blackburn, author of the b…Read more
  •  209
    Comments on Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3). 2006.
    University of Cambridge.
  •  50
    Professor whatever
    Disputatio 1 (8): 1-12. 2000.
  •  203
    A very short essay on religion
    Think 11 (32): 33-36. 2012.
    My impression is that the fire-breathing atheists about whom we hear so much – the celebrated quartet of Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Dan Dennett – think of religious commitments in terms of mistaken or at least hopelessly improbable and therefore irrational ontology. Believers think that something exists, but the overwhelmingly probable truth is that it does not. I may be wrong that this is what they think, but whether they do so or not, I am sure others do. Yet this i…Read more
  •  2
    Spreading the world
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3): 385-387. 1984.
  •  19
    Philosophical Logic
    Open University Press. 1980.
  •  200
    Swinburne on religion and ethics
    Think 7 (20): 17-21. 2008.
    Simon Blackburn responds to the preceding article by Richard Swinburne.
  •  121
    Humanity's natural face
    Philosophical Explorations 3 (3). 2000.
    In my article I summarize a 'Humean' view of deliberation, and in particular deliberation with an ethical aspect. I regard Hume as having paved the way for a 'naturalistic' account of these things, avoiding Kantian fantasies of agency that dominate much current work. Contrary to what is often supposed, the Humean story gives a satisfactory account of dutiful or principled motivations, and a rich account of the ways in which different aspects of character are selected as 'useful or agreeable to o…Read more
  •  87
    What is Truth?
    Cogito 1 (3): 11-13. 1987.
  •  35
    Meaning, Reference and Necessity: New Studies in Semantics (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 1975.
    A volume of studies in philosophical logic by a group of younger philosophers in the UK. There is a core of problems in the theory of meaning which have been accorded a central importance by philosophers, logicians and theoretical linguists, and which have stimulated some of the most powerful and original work in these subjects. The contributors to the volume have a common interest in these topics, insist on their continuing and fundamental importance, and offer here a distinctive and original c…Read more
  •  153
    Relatively speaking
    Think 1 (2): 83-88. 2002.
    Is what's true ultimately relative to your point of view? So that what's true as viewed from over here might be false if viewed from over there? In this article, Simon Blackburn grapples with the suggestion that what's true is ultimately just a matter of perspective.
  •  124
    Gibbard on normative logic
    Philosophical Issues 4 60-66. 1993.