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469Quasi-Realism no FictionalismIn Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press. pp. 322--338. 2005.
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20Comments on Gibbard’s Thinking How to LivePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3): 699-706. 2006.University of Cambridge.
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7Securing the nots: moral epistemology for the quasi-realistIn Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 82--100. 1996.
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164How to Read HumeGranta. 2008.Simon Blackburn. 1985. Garrett, Don. Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Gaskin, J.C. A. Hume's Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988. Holden, T.The Architecture ...
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211. The Self: Iris Murdoch and Uncle WilliamIn Mirror, Mirror: The Uses and Abuses of Self-Love, Princeton University Press. pp. 12-34. 2014.
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67Précis of Ruling PassionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 122-135. 2002.Ruling Passions is about human nature. It is an invitation to see human nature a certain way. It defends this way of looking at ourselves against competitors, including rational choice theory, modern Kantianism, various applications of evolutionary psychology, views that enchant our natures, and those that disenchant them in the direction of relativism or nihilism. It is a story centred upon a view of human ethical nature, which it places amongst other facets of human nature, as just one of the …Read more
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114The Last WordPhilosophical Review 107 (4): 653. 1998.Like all of Nagel's work, this is a book with a message: an apparently clear, simple message, forcefully presented and repeated. The message is that there is a limit to the extent to which we can "get outside" fundamental forms of thought, including logical, mathematical, scientific, and ethical thought. "Getting outside" means taking up a biological or psychological or sociological or economic or political view of ourselves as thinkers. It also inclines many people to talk of the contingency or…Read more
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6Reply : Rule-following and moral realismIn Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, Routledge. pp. 163--87. 1981.
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23How is meaning possible?— II reply to professor TennantPhilosophical Books 26 (3): 129-132. 1985.
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143Truth: a guideOxford University Press. 2005.The author of the highly popular book Think, which Time magazine hailed as "the one book every smart person should read to understand, and even enjoy, the key questions of philosophy," Simon Blackburn is that rara avis--an eminent thinker who is able to explain philosophy to the general reader. Now Blackburn offers a tour de force exploration of what he calls "the most exciting and engaging issue in the whole of philosophy"--the age-old war over truth. The front lines of this war are well define…Read more
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40The Emergence of Probability By Ian Hacking Cambridge University Press, 1975, 209 pp., £5.50 (review)Philosophy 51 (198): 476-. 1976.
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86Relativism and the abolition of the otherInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3). 2004.In this paper I consider the 'disappearing we' account of Wittgenstein's attitude to other ways of thought or other 'conceptual schemes'. I argue that there is no evidence that Wittgenstein expected the 'we' to disappear, in the manner of Davidson, and that his affinities with relativistic trains of thought in fact go much deeper.
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101Comments on Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3). 2006.University of Cambridge.
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26. RespectIn Mirror, Mirror: The Uses and Abuses of Self-Love, Princeton University Press. pp. 109-131. 2014.
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81Deflationism, Pluralism, Expressivism, PragmatismIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 263. 2012.
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458Practical tortoise raisingMind 104 (416): 695-711. 1995.In this paper I am not so much concerned with movements of the mind, as movements of the will. But my question bears a similarity to that of the tortoise. I want to ask whether the will is under the control of fact and reason, combined. I shall try to show that there is always something else, something that is not under the control of fact and reason, which has to be given as a brute extra, if deliberation is ever to end by determining the will. This is, of course, a Humean conclusion, and the o…Read more
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67Some remarks about value as a work of literatureBritish Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1): 85-88. 2010.Peter Lamarque's splendid and informative book, The Philosphy of Literature , deserves a much fuller response than I can give in this brief note. It is brimful with insights into the nature of literature, and into the debates between philosophers interested in literature, and I cannot imagine anyone failing to learn from it. The question I propose to take up is by no means the most important that Lamarque raises, nor am I even certain that I can add anything useful to his own discussion of it. Y…Read more
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University of North Carolina, Chapel HillDistinguished Research Professor (Part-time)
Cambridge, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland