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66Review of Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (5). 2004.
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650Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticismIn Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays, Routledge. 2018.According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that a…Read more
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259Minding your own business? Understanding indifference as a virtuePhilosophical Perspectives 28 (1): 111-126. 2014.Indifference is sometimes described as a virtue. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically acceptable forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
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22(Hard ernst) corrigendum Van Brakel, J., philosophy of chemistry (u. klein)Erkenntnis 57 (1): 91-122. 2002.It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on…Read more
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180Who is my neighbour? Understanding indifference as a vicePhilosophy 89 (4): 559-579. 2014.Indifference is often described as a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically problematic forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
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1452Smith on moral fetishismAnalysis 57 (3). 1997.In his book The Moral Problem and in a recent issue of this journal, Michael Smith claims to refute any theory which construes the relationship between moral judgements and motivation as contingent and rationally optional. Smith’s argument fails. In showing how it fails, I shall make three claims. First, a concern for what is right, where this is read de dicto, does not amount to moral fetishism. Second, it is not always morally preferable to care about what is right, where this is read de re. T…Read more
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1675The Nature and Ethics of IndifferenceThe Journal of Ethics 21 (1): 17-35. 2017.Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or …Read more
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124Review. From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysisBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1): 169-173. 1999.
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756Autonomy, Value and the First PersonIn Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder, Oxford University Press. 2012.This paper explores the claim that someone can reasonably consider themselves to be under a duty to respect the autonomy of a person who does not have the capacities normally associated with substantial self-governance.
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1145Moral error theoryProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2). 2004.The paper explores the consequences of adopting a moral error theory targeted at the notion of reasonable convergence. I examine the prospects of two ways of combining acceptance of such a theory with continued acceptance of moral judgements in some form. On the first model, moral judgements are accepted as a pragmatically intelligible fiction. On the second model, moral judgements are made relative to a framework of assumptions with no claim to reasonable convergence on their behalf. I argue th…Read more
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690Facts, Ends, and Normative ReasonsThe Journal of Ethics 14 (1): 17-26. 2010.This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
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456Who needs bioethicists?Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (1): 131-144. 2003.Recent years have seen the emergence of a new brand of moral philosopher. Straddling the gap between academia on the one hand, and the world of law, medicine, and politics on the other, bioethicists have appeared, offering advice on ethical issues to a wider public than the philosophy classroom. Some bioethicists, like Peter Singer, have achieved wide notoriety in the public realm with provocative arguments that challenge widely held beliefs about the relative moral status of animals, human foet…Read more
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463The Idea of a Normative ReasonIn P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik, . pp. 41--65. 2003.Recent work in English speaking moral philosophy has seen the rise to prominence of the idea of a normative reason1. By ‘normative reasons’ I mean the reasons agents appeal to in making rational claims on each other. Normative reasons are good reasons on which agents ought to act, even if they are not actually motivated accordingly2. To this extent, normative reasons are distinguishable from the motivating reasons agents appeal to in reason explanations. Even agents who fail to act on their norm…Read more
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7Review of Robert Audi, Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5). 2006.
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615Smile when you’re winning: how to become a Cambridge pragmatistIn Cheryl Misak & Huw Price (eds.), The Practical Turn: Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century, Oup/ba. 2016.The aim of this paper is to trace the development of a particular current of thought known under the label ‘pragmatism’ in the last part of the Twentieth century and the beginning of the Twenty-first. I address three questions about this current of thought. First, what is its actual historical development? Second, does it constitute a single, coherent, philosophical outlook? Third, in what form, if any, does it constitute an attractive philosophical outlook. In the course of addressing these q…Read more
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IntroductionIn Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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14Consequentialism and Global EthicsIn Michael Boylan (ed.), The Morality and Global Justice Reader, Westview Press. pp. 89. 2011.
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58Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, written by Jonas Olson (review)International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1): 57-61. 2017._ Source: _Page Count 5
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559Moral CognitivismPhilosophical Papers 31 (1): 1-25. 2002.Abstract The paper explicates a set of criteria the joint satisfaction of which is taken to qualify moral judgements as cognitive. The paper examines evidence that some moral judgements meet these criteria, and relates the resulting conception of moral judgements to ongoing controversies about cognitivism in ethics
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793Constructivism and the Error TheoryIn Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics, Continuum. 2011.This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory
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890Methods of ethics and the descent of man: Darwin and Sidgwick on ethics and evolutionBiology and Philosophy 25 (3): 361-378. 2010.Darwin’s treatment of morality in The Descent of Man has generated a wide variety of responses among moral philosophers. Among these is the dismissal of evolution as irrelevant to ethics by Darwin’s contemporary Henry Sidgwick; the last, and arguably the greatest, of the Nineteenth Century British Utilitarians. This paper offers a re-examination of Sidgwick’s response to evolutionary considerations as irrelevant to ethics and the absence of any engagement with Darwin’s work in Sidgwick’s main et…Read more
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33From genes to eugenicsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 32 (4): 589-600. 2001.
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311Analytical dispositionalism and practical reasonEthical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2): 117-133. 1999.The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense eth…Read more
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1373Values of Art and the Ethical QuestionBritish Journal of Aesthetics 48 (4): 376-394. 2008.Does the ethical value of a work of art ever contribute to its aesthetic value? I argue that when conventionally interpreted as a request for a conceptual analysis the answer to this question is indeterminate. I then propose a different interpretation of the question on which it is understood as a substantial and normative question internal to the practice of aesthetic criticism.
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35Review of Richard Joyce, Simon Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7). 2010.
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8409The Argument from QueernessIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London
Birkbeck, University of London
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Birkbeck College, University Of LondonDepartment Of PhilosophyProfessor
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Sheffield, South Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |