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7Review of Robert Audi, Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5). 2006.
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IntroductionIn Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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14Consequentialism and Global EthicsIn Michael Boylan (ed.), The Morality and Global Justice Reader, Westview Press. pp. 89. 2011.
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58Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, written by Jonas Olson (review)International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1): 57-61. 2017._ Source: _Page Count 5
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565Moral CognitivismPhilosophical Papers 31 (1): 1-25. 2002.Abstract The paper explicates a set of criteria the joint satisfaction of which is taken to qualify moral judgements as cognitive. The paper examines evidence that some moral judgements meet these criteria, and relates the resulting conception of moral judgements to ongoing controversies about cognitivism in ethics
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811Constructivism and the Error TheoryIn Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics, Continuum. 2011.This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory
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914Methods of ethics and the descent of man: Darwin and Sidgwick on ethics and evolutionBiology and Philosophy 25 (3): 361-378. 2010.Darwin’s treatment of morality in The Descent of Man has generated a wide variety of responses among moral philosophers. Among these is the dismissal of evolution as irrelevant to ethics by Darwin’s contemporary Henry Sidgwick; the last, and arguably the greatest, of the Nineteenth Century British Utilitarians. This paper offers a re-examination of Sidgwick’s response to evolutionary considerations as irrelevant to ethics and the absence of any engagement with Darwin’s work in Sidgwick’s main et…Read more
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33From genes to eugenicsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 32 (4): 589-600. 2001.
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315Analytical dispositionalism and practical reasonEthical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2): 117-133. 1999.The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense eth…Read more
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1398Values of Art and the Ethical QuestionBritish Journal of Aesthetics 48 (4): 376-394. 2008.Does the ethical value of a work of art ever contribute to its aesthetic value? I argue that when conventionally interpreted as a request for a conceptual analysis the answer to this question is indeterminate. I then propose a different interpretation of the question on which it is understood as a substantial and normative question internal to the practice of aesthetic criticism.
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8485The Argument from QueernessIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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37Review of Richard Joyce, Simon Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7). 2010.
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669An Assumption of Extreme Significance: Moore, Ross and Spencer on Ethics and EvolutionIn Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability, Oxford University Press Uk. 2016.In recent years there has been a growing interest among mainstream Anglophone moral philosophers in the empirical study of human morality, including its evolution and historical development. This chapter compares these developments with an earlier point of contact between moral philosophy and the moral sciences in the early decades of the Twentieth century, as manifested in some of the less frequently discussed arguments of G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross. It is argued that a critical appreciation of…Read more
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22Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, & ReasonsPhilosophical Quarterly 65 (258): 120-123. 2015.
Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London
Birkbeck, University of London
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Birkbeck College, University Of LondonDepartment Of PhilosophyProfessor
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Sheffield, South Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |