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11From Genes to EugenicsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 32 (4): 589-600. 2001.
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151Who cares where you come from? cultivating virtues of indifferenceIn Tabitha Freeman Susanna Graham & Fatemeh Ebtehaj Martin Richards (eds.), Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction: families, origins and identities, Cambridge University Press. pp. 97-112. 2014.Book synopsis: Assisted reproduction challenges and reinforces traditional understandings of family, kinship and identity. Sperm, egg and embryo donation and surrogacy raise questions about relatedness for parents, children and others involved in creating and raising a child. How socially, morally or psychologically significant is a genetic link between a donor-conceived child and their donor? What should children born through assisted reproduction be told about their origins? Does it matter if …Read more
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3012Benefit, disability and the non-identity problemIn Nafsika Athanassoulis (ed.), Philosophical Reflections on Medical Ethics, Palgrave-macmillan. 2005.
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2244The Companions in Guilt StrategyIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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380Revisionary dispositionalism and practical reasonThe Journal of Ethics 4 (3): 173-190. 2000.This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.
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789A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error TheoristsRatio 26 (3): 373-390. 2013.This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice
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317I—Hallvard Lillehammer: Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of AutonomyAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1): 111-127. 2014.According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or political as an epistemological questio…Read more
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1084Davidson on value and objectivityDialectica 61 (2). 2007.According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all
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806The Epistemology of Ethical IntuitionsPhilosophy 86 (2): 175-200. 2011.Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substa…Read more
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66Review of Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (5). 2004.
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643Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticismIn Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays, Routledge. 2018.According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that a…Read more
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258Minding your own business? Understanding indifference as a virtuePhilosophical Perspectives 28 (1): 111-126. 2014.Indifference is sometimes described as a virtue. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically acceptable forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
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21(Hard ernst) corrigendum Van Brakel, J., philosophy of chemistry (u. klein)Erkenntnis 57 (1): 91-122. 2002.It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on…Read more
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180Who is my neighbour? Understanding indifference as a vicePhilosophy 89 (4): 559-579. 2014.Indifference is often described as a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically problematic forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London
Birkbeck, University of London
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Birkbeck College, University Of LondonDepartment Of PhilosophyProfessor
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Sheffield, South Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |