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Hallvard Lillehammer

University of Sheffield
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    82
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    3
  •  News and Updates
    29

 More details
  • University of Sheffield
    Professor
Homepage
Sheffield, South Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory
Philosophy, Misc
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Value Theory
Philosophy, Misc
  • All publications (82)
  •  79
    Review of Richard Joyce, Simon Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7). 2010.
    Moral Error Theories and FictionalismMoral Naturalism
  •  1269
    Ethics, evolution and the a priori: Ross on Spencer and the French Sociologists
    In Michael Ruse & Robert J. Richards (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics, Cambridge University Press. 2017.
    In this chapter I critically discuss the dismissal of the philosophical significance of facts about human evolution and historical development in the work of W. D Ross. I address Ross’s views about the philosophical significance of the emerging human sciences of his time in two of his main works, namely The Right and the Good and The Foundations of Ethics. I argue that the debate between Ross and his chosen interlocutors (Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim and Lucien Levy-Bruhl) shows striking simi…Read more
    In this chapter I critically discuss the dismissal of the philosophical significance of facts about human evolution and historical development in the work of W. D Ross. I address Ross’s views about the philosophical significance of the emerging human sciences of his time in two of his main works, namely The Right and the Good and The Foundations of Ethics. I argue that the debate between Ross and his chosen interlocutors (Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim and Lucien Levy-Bruhl) shows striking similarities with parallel debates in contemporary moral philosophy.
    Moral Epistemology, MiscMoral Nonnaturalism20th Century Philosophy, MiscMeta-Ethics, MiscMoral Intui…Read more
    Moral Epistemology, MiscMoral Nonnaturalism20th Century Philosophy, MiscMeta-Ethics, MiscMoral IntuitionismEvolution of Morality
  •  167
    Normative Antirealism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2): 201-225. 1999.
    Moral Error Theories and FictionalismReasons, MiscMoral RelativismPratical Reason, Misc
  • Introduction
    In Hallvard Lillehammer & David Hugh Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
    French Philosophy
  •  3490
    Benefit, disability and the non-identity problem
    In Nafsika Athanassoulis (ed.), Philosophical reflections on medical ethics, Palgrave-macmillan. 2005.
    Medical Ethics
  •  1033
    The doctrine of internal reasons
    Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4): 507-516. 2000.
    According to advocates of internalism about reasons for action, there is an interesting connection between an agent’s reasons and the agent’s present desires. On the simplest version of this view, an agent has a reason to act a certain way at some time if and only if acting that way would promote his present desires. Let us call this the sub-Humean model.1 The sub-Humean model is widely regarded as too simple on the grounds that there are adverse conditions, such as massive confusion, in which d…Read more
    According to advocates of internalism about reasons for action, there is an interesting connection between an agent’s reasons and the agent’s present desires. On the simplest version of this view, an agent has a reason to act a certain way at some time if and only if acting that way would promote his present desires. Let us call this the sub-Humean model.1 The sub-Humean model is widely regarded as too simple on the grounds that there are adverse conditions, such as massive confusion, in which desires are irrationally possessed or acquired, thereby failing to provide reasons for action.2
    Internalism and Externalism about Reasons
  •  3457
    The Companions in Guilt Strategy
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
    Moral Realism and Irrealism, MiscPratical Reason, MiscMeta-Ethics, MiscMoral Normativity, Misc
  •  58
    Review of Alan Millar, Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8). 2005.
    Value Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  1398
    A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists
    Ratio 26 (3): 373-390. 2013.
    This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice
    Moral Realism and Irrealism, Misc
  •  1530
    Methods of ethics and the descent of man: Darwin and Sidgwick on ethics and evolution
    Biology and Philosophy 25 (3): 361-378. 2010.
    Darwin’s treatment of morality in The Descent of Man has generated a wide variety of responses among moral philosophers. Among these is the dismissal of evolution as irrelevant to ethics by Darwin’s contemporary Henry Sidgwick; the last, and arguably the greatest, of the Nineteenth Century British Utilitarians. This paper offers a re-examination of Sidgwick’s response to evolutionary considerations as irrelevant to ethics and the absence of any engagement with Darwin’s work in Sidgwick’s main et…Read more
    Darwin’s treatment of morality in The Descent of Man has generated a wide variety of responses among moral philosophers. Among these is the dismissal of evolution as irrelevant to ethics by Darwin’s contemporary Henry Sidgwick; the last, and arguably the greatest, of the Nineteenth Century British Utilitarians. This paper offers a re-examination of Sidgwick’s response to evolutionary considerations as irrelevant to ethics and the absence of any engagement with Darwin’s work in Sidgwick’s main ethical treatise, The Methods of Ethics . This assessment of Sidgwick’s response to Darwin’s work is shown to have significance for a number of ongoing controversies in contemporary metaethics.
    Evolution of MoralityHenry Sidgwick
  •  1585
    Davidson on value and objectivity
    Dialectica 61 (2). 2007.
    According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all
    Donald DavidsonValueMoral Judgment
  •  222
    Who cares where you come from? cultivating virtues of indifference
    In Tabitha Freeman Susanna Graham & Fatemeh Ebtehaj Martin Richards (eds.), Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction: families, origins and identities, Cambridge University Press. pp. 97-112. 2014.
    Book synopsis: Assisted reproduction challenges and reinforces traditional understandings of family, kinship and identity. Sperm, egg and embryo donation and surrogacy raise questions about relatedness for parents, children and others involved in creating and raising a child. How socially, morally or psychologically significant is a genetic link between a donor-conceived child and their donor? What should children born through assisted reproduction be told about their origins? Does it matter if …Read more
    Book synopsis: Assisted reproduction challenges and reinforces traditional understandings of family, kinship and identity. Sperm, egg and embryo donation and surrogacy raise questions about relatedness for parents, children and others involved in creating and raising a child. How socially, morally or psychologically significant is a genetic link between a donor-conceived child and their donor? What should children born through assisted reproduction be told about their origins? Does it matter if a parent is genetically unrelated to their child? How do experiences differ for men and women using collaborative reproduction in heterosexual or same-sex couples, single parent families or co-parenting arrangements? What impact does the wider cultural, socio-legal and regulatory context have? In this multidisciplinary book, an international team of academics and clinicians bring together new empirical research and social science, legal and bioethical perspectives to explore the key issue of relatedness in assisted reproduction.
    Biomedical EthicsReproductive Ethics
  •  154
    Review: Metaethics after Moore (review)
    Mind 116 (463): 756-758. 2007.
    G. E. Moore
  •  1221
    Scanlon on intention and permissibility
    Analysis 70 (3): 578-585. 2010.
    Topics in Deontological Moral TheoriesMoral DilemmasMoral ContractualismEthical Theories, MiscThe Do…Read more
    Topics in Deontological Moral TheoriesMoral DilemmasMoral ContractualismEthical Theories, MiscThe Doctrine of Double Effect
  •  1338
    Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism
    In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays, Routledge. 2018.
    According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that a…Read more
    According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that are sometimes associated with moral skepticism. The first is the suspicion that in making moral claims we are merely projecting our attitudes onto the world. The second is the suspicion that in arguing for and against moral views we are merely attempting to influence each other to give similar answers to questions that have no determinate answer.
    Moral ConstructivismMoral ProjectivismMoral Error Theories and FictionalismMoral Irrealism, MiscMora…Read more
    Moral ConstructivismMoral ProjectivismMoral Error Theories and FictionalismMoral Irrealism, MiscMoral Realism and Irrealism, Misc
  •  85
    Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, & Reasons
    Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258): 120-123. 2015.
    Ethics
  •  124
    Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3): 455-457. 2008.
    Rights
  •  88
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 105 (420): 691-694. 1996.
  •  1472
    The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions
    Philosophy 86 (2): 175-200. 2011.
    Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substa…Read more
    Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substantially ethical one. I argue that this fact illuminates the epistemology of ethical intuitions
    Meta-Ethics, General WorksMoral Epistemology, MiscMoral IntuitionismReflective Equilibrium
  •  2965
    The Nature and Ethics of Indifference
    The Journal of Ethics 21 (1): 17-35. 2017.
    Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or …Read more
    Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of its object. The resulting analysis is located in a wider context of moral psychology and ethical theory; in particular with respect to work on the virtues of care, empathy and other forms of affective engagement. During the course of this discussion, a number of recent claims associated with the ethics of care and empathy are shown to be either misleading or implausible.
    Ethics, MiscMoral Psychology, MiscVirtue Ethics, MiscEthics of CareVirtues and Vices
  •  120
    Review of Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (5). 2004.
    Moral RealismNaturalism
  •  1423
    Autonomy, Value and the First Person
    In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder, Oxford University Press. 2012.
    This paper explores the claim that someone can reasonably consider themselves to be under a duty to respect the autonomy of a person who does not have the capacities normally associated with substantial self-governance.
    HealthBiomedical Ethics, MiscInformed Consent in MedicineAutonomy in Applied Ethics
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