-
2311The Companions in Guilt StrategyIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
-
820A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error TheoristsRatio 26 (3): 373-390. 2013.This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice
-
407Revisionary dispositionalism and practical reasonThe Journal of Ethics 4 (3): 173-190. 2000.This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.
-
61I—Hallvard Lillehammer: Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of AutonomyAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1): 111-127. 2014.According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or political as an epistemological questio…Read more
-
1132Davidson on value and objectivityDialectica 61 (2). 2007.According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all
-
832The Epistemology of Ethical IntuitionsPhilosophy 86 (2): 175-200. 2011.Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substa…Read more
-
66Review of Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (5). 2004.
-
633Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticismIn Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays, Routledge. 2018.According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that a…Read more
-
261Minding your own business? Understanding indifference as a virtuePhilosophical Perspectives 28 (1): 111-126. 2014.Indifference is sometimes described as a virtue. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically acceptable forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
-
23(Hard ernst) corrigendum Van Brakel, J., philosophy of chemistry (u. klein)Erkenntnis 57 (1): 91-122. 2002.It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on…Read more
-
180Who is my neighbour? Understanding indifference as a vicePhilosophy 89 (4): 559-579. 2014.Indifference is often described as a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically problematic forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
-
1455Smith on moral fetishismAnalysis 57 (3). 1997.In his book The Moral Problem and in a recent issue of this journal, Michael Smith claims to refute any theory which construes the relationship between moral judgements and motivation as contingent and rationally optional. Smith’s argument fails. In showing how it fails, I shall make three claims. First, a concern for what is right, where this is read de dicto, does not amount to moral fetishism. Second, it is not always morally preferable to care about what is right, where this is read de re. T…Read more
-
1663The Nature and Ethics of IndifferenceThe Journal of Ethics 21 (1): 17-35. 2017.Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or …Read more
-
766Autonomy, Value and the First PersonIn Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder, Oxford University Press. 2012.This paper explores the claim that someone can reasonably consider themselves to be under a duty to respect the autonomy of a person who does not have the capacities normally associated with substantial self-governance.
-
124Review. From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysisBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1): 169-173. 1999.
Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London
Birkbeck, University of London
-
Birkbeck College, University Of LondonDepartment Of PhilosophyProfessor
-
Sheffield, South Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |