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85By combining experimental interventions with search procedures for graphical causal models we show that under familiar assumptions, with perfect data, N - 1 experiments suffice to determine the causal relations among N > 2 variables when each experiment randomizes at most one variable. We show the same bound holds for adaptive learners, but does not hold for N > 4 when each experiment can simultaneously randomize more than one variable. This bound provides a type of ideal for the measure of succ…Read more
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57Getting to the Truth through Conceptual RevolutionsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990. 1990.There is a popular view that the alleged meaning shifts resulting from scientific revolutions are somehow incompatible with the formulation of general norms for scientific inquiry. We construct methods that can be shown to be maximally reliable at getting to the truth when the truth changes in response to the state of the scientist or his society.
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380Theory and EvidencePrinceton University Press. 1980.The Description for this book, Theory and Evidence, will be forthcoming.
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1Causation and Statistical InferenceIn Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press Uk. 2009.
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279What is right with 'bayes net methods' and what is wrong with 'hunting causes and using them'?British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1): 161-211. 2010.Nancy Cartwright's recent criticisms of efforts and methods to obtain causal information from sample data using automated search are considered. In addition to reviewing that effort, I argue that almost all of her criticisms are false and rest on misreading, overgeneralization, or neglect of the relevant literature
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90Interpreting LeamerEconomics and Philosophy 1 (2): 290. 1985.It is easy for a professional philosopher who reads Learner's essay “Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics” to find a great deal in it that seems contentious, cavalier, or objectionable. Philosophers may even be puzzled as to what the fuss is all about. My guess is that the sorts of complaints philosophical readers are likely to make about Learner's paper are more the result of style than substance. The substance is very important
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56Review of Eric Christian Barnes, The Paradox of Predictivism (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6). 2008.
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