Clark Glymour

"Goodness of Fit": Clinical Applications from Infancy through Adult Life. By Stella Chess & Alexander Thomas. Brunner/Mazel, Philadelphia, PA, 1999. pp. 229. pound24.95 (hb). Chess and Thomas's pioneering longitudinal studies of temperamental individuality started over 40 years ago (Thomas et al., 1963). Their publications soon became and remain classics. Their concept of "goodness of fit" emerges out of this monumental work but has had a long gestation period. In their new book, the authors distinguish between behaviour disorders that are reactive to the child's life circumstances, including life events, and which are self-correcting or responsive to the relevant changes in their environment, and more serious disorders

The ability to identify the mineral composition of rocks and soils is an important tool for the exploration of geological sites. Even though expert knowledge is commonly used for this task, it is desirable to create automated systems with similar or better performance. For instance, NASA intends to design robots that are sufficiently autonomous to perform this task on planetary missions. Spectrometer readings provide one important source of data for identifying sites with minerals of interest. Reflectance spectrometers measure intensities of light reflected from surfaces over a range of wavelengths. Spectral intensity patterns may in some cases be sufficiently distinctive for proper identification of minerals or classes of minerals. For some mineral classes, carbonates for example, specific short spectral intervals are known to carry a distinctive signature. Finding similar distinctive spectral ranges for other mineral classes is not an easy problem. We propose and evaluate data-driven techniques in two stages: first, evaluating algorithms to identify which components are probably present in a given rock; second, trying to improve this classification by automatically searching for spectral ranges optimized for specific classes of minerals. In one set of studies, we partition the whole interval of wavelengths available in our data into sub-intervals, or bins, and use a genetic algorithm to evaluate a candidate selection of subintervals. As an alternative to these computationally expensive search techniques, we present an entropy-based heuristic that gives higher scores for wavelengths more likely to distinguish between classes. Results are presented for four different classes, showing reasonable improvements in identifying some, but not all, of the mineral classes tested.

Twenty years ago, Nancy Cartwright wrote a perceptive essay in which she clearly distinguished causal relations from associations, introduced philosophers to Simpson’s paradox, articulated the difficulties for reductive probabilistic analyses of causation that flow from these observations, and connected causal relations with strategies of action (Cartwright 1979). Five years later, without appreciating her essay, I and my (then) students began to develop formal representations of causal and probabilistic relations, which, subsequently informed by the work of computer scientists and statisticians, led eventually to a practical theory of causal inference and prediction, a theory incorporating some of the sensibilities Cartwright had voiced (Glymour et al. 1987; Spirtes et al. 1993). That theory, and ideas related to it, have become a subfield of computer science with contributions far deeper than mine from many sources, and its inferential and predictive techniques have been successfully applied in biology, economics, educational research, geology and space physics.

Convergent realists desire scientific methods that converge reliably to informative, true theories over a wide range of theoretical possibilities. Much attention has been paid to the problem of induction from quantifier-free data. In this paper, we employ the techniques of formal learning theory and model theory to explore the reliable inference of theories from data containing alternating quantifiers. We obtain a hierarchy of inductive problems depending on the quantifier prefix complexity of the formulas that constitute the data, and we provide bounds relating the quantifier prefix complexity of the data to the quantifier prefix complexity of the theories that can be reliably inferred from such data without background knowledge. We also examine the question whether there are theories with mixed quantifiers that can be reliably inferred with closed, universal formulas in the data, but not without

Contemporary cognitive neuropsychology attempts to infer unobserved features of normal human cognition, or ‘cognitive architecture’, from experiments with normals and with brain-damaged subjects in whom certain normal cognitive capacities are altered, diminished, or absent. Fundamental methodological issues about the enterprise of cognitive neuropsychology concern the characterization of methods by which features of normal cognitive architecture can be identified from such data, the assumptions upon which the reliability of such methods are premised, and the limits of such methods—even granting their assumptions—in resolving uncertainties about that architecture. With some idealization, the question of the capacities of various experimental designs in cognitive neuropsychology to uncover cognitive architecture can be reduced to comparatively simple questions about the prior assumptions investigators are willing to make. This paper presents some of simplest of those reductions.

Words, Thoughts and Theories arguesthat infants and children discover the physical and psychological featuresof the world by a process akin to scientific inquiry, more or less asconceived by philosophers of science in the 1960s (the theory theory).This essay discusses some of the philosophical background to analternative, more popular, ``modular'''' or ``maturational'''' account ofdevelopment, dismisses an array of philosophical objections to the theorytheory, suggests that the theory theory offers an undeveloped project forartificial intelligence, and, relying on recent psychological work oncausation, offers suggestions about how principles of causal inference mayprovide a developmental solution to the ``frame problem''''.

We describe a unification of old and recent ideas for formulating graphical models to explain time series data, including Granger causality, semi-automated search procedures for graphical causal models, modeling of contemporaneous influences in times series, and heuristic generalized additive model corrections to linear models. We illustrate the procedures by finding a structure of exogenous variables and mediating variables among time series of remote geospatial indices of ocean surface temperatures and pressures. The analysis agrees with known exogenous drivers of the indices, not assumed in the analysis. Automated search applied to the residuals after regressing each series on its lags and the lags of its Granger causes yields a graphical model of “comtemporaneous” causal relations identical with the qualitative graphical relations from the time series. A similar analysis produces reasonable results when applied to candidate climate indices obtained by a clustering method from sea surface temperature and sea level pressure data.

We outline a cognitive and computational account of causal learning in children. We propose that children employ specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate “causal map” of the world: an abstract, coherent representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously represented by the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or “Bayes nets”. Human causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learnig causal Bayes nets and for predicting with them. Preliminary experimental results suggest that 2- to 4-year-old children spontaneously construct new causal maps and that their learning is consistent with the Bayes-Net formalism.

Time series of macroscopic quantities that are aggregates of microscopic quantities, with unknown one‐many relations between macroscopic and microscopic states, are common in applied sciences, from economics to climate studies. When such time series of macroscopic quantities are claimed to be causal, the causal relations postulated are representable by a directed acyclic graph and associated probability distribution—sometimes called a dynamical Bayes net. Causal interpretations of such series imply claims that hypothetical manipulations of macroscopic variables have unambiguous effects on variables “downstream” in the graph, and such macroscopic variables may be predictably produced or altered even while particular microstates are not. This paper argues that such causal time series of macroscopic aggregates of microscopic processes are the appropriate model for mental causation.

The claims of science and the claims of probability combine in two ways. In one, probability is part of the content of science, as in statistical mechanics and quantum theory and an enormous range of "models" developed in applied statistics. In the other, probability is the tool used to explain and to justify methods of inference from records of observations, as in every science from psychiatry to physics. These intimacies between science and probability are logical sports, for while we think science aims to say what happens, what has happened, what will happen, what would happen if other things were to happen, what could and could not happen, what will nearly happen, or what will approximate what will happen, probability claims say none of these things, or at least none of them about the phenomena with which science is concerned. On that, at least, almost all philosophical interpreters of probability since DeMoivre agree, with whatever reluctance. Consider some examples.

S CIENTISTS often claim that an experiment or observation tests certain hypotheses within a complex theory but not others. Relativity theorists, for example, are unanimous in the judgment that measurements of the gravitational red shift do not test the field equations of general relativity; psychoanalysts sometimes complain that experimental tests of Freudian theory are at best tests of rather peripheral hypotheses; astronomers do not regard observations of the positions of a single planet as a test of Kepler's third law, even though those observations may test Kepler's first and second laws. Observations are regarded as relevant to some hypotheses in a theory but not relevant to others in that same theory. There is another kind of scientific judgment that may or may not be related to such judgments of relevance: determinations of the accuracy of the predictions of some theories are not held to provide tests of those theories, or, at least, positive results are not held to support or confirm the theories in question. There are, for example, special relativistic theories of gravity that predict the same phenomena as does general relativity, yet the theories are regarded as..