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288Learning causes: Psychological explanations of causal explanation (review)Minds and Machines 8 (1): 39-60. 1998.I argue that psychologists interested in human causal judgment should understand and adopt a representation of causal mechanisms by directed graphs that encode conditional independence (screening off) relations. I illustrate the benefits of that representation, now widely used in computer science and increasingly in statistics, by (i) showing that a dispute in psychology between ‘mechanist’ and ‘associationist’ psychological theories of causation rests on a false and confused dichotomy; (ii) sho…Read more
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209Revisions of bootstrap testingPhilosophy of Science 50 (4): 626-629. 1983.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use.
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62The ability to identify the mineral composition of rocks and soils is an important tool for the exploration of geological sites. Even though expert knowledge is commonly used for this task, it is desirable to create automated systems with similar or better performance. For instance, NASA intends to design robots that are sufficiently autonomous to perform this task on planetary missions. Spectrometer readings provide one important source of data for identifying sites with minerals of interest. R…Read more
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6Why I am not a BayesianIn Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, Routledge. 2011.
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71Poincaré’s Probabilities, Kantified, Post-Modernized (review)Biological Theory 9 (1): 113-114. 2014.One of a pair of reviews of Michael Strevens’ book, Tychomancy: Inferring Probability from Causal Structure, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2013, pp 265, $39.95 hbk, ISBN 978-0674073111. See also Bookstein (2014, this issue)
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1"Afterword to" Freud, Kepler and the Clinical EvidenceIn Richard Wollheim & James Hopkins (eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge University Press. pp. 29--31. 1982.
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109The "dynamical systems" model of cognitive processing is not an alternative computational model. The proposals about "computation" that accompany it are either vacuous or do not distinguish it from a variety of standard computational models. I conclude that the real motivation for van Gelder's version of the account is not technical or computational, but is rather in the spirit of natur-philosophie.
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