Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
  •  4
    Physics by convention
    Philosophy of Science 39 (3): 322-340. 1972.
    “It ain't nuthin' until I call it.”Bill Guthrie, UmpireNumerous criticisms of Adolf Grünbaum's account of conventions in physics have been published, and he has replied to most of them. Nonetheless, there seem to me to be good reasons for offering further criticism. In the first place Grünbaum's philosophy seems to me at least partly an extrapolation of one aspect of the views on conventions developed by Reichenbach and others. Since I think many of the issues which Reichenbach attempted to sett…Read more
  •  1
    "Afterword to" Freud, Kepler and the Clinical Evidence
    In Richard Wollheim & James Hopkins (eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge University Press. pp. 29--31. 1982.
  •  21
    Thoroughly Modern Meno
    In Clark Glymour & Kevin T. Kelly (eds.), Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science, University of California Press: Berkeley. pp. 3--22. 1992.
    Clark Glymour and Kevin T. Kelly. Thoroughly Modern Meno
  •  31
    On some patterns of reduction
    Philosophy of Science 37 (3): 340-353. 1970.
    The notion of reduction in the natural sciences has been assimilated to the notion of inter-theoretical explanation. Many philosophers of science (following Nagel) have held that the apparently ontological issues involved in reduction should be replaced by analyses of the syntactic and semantic connections involved in explaining one theory on the basis of another. The replacement does not seem to have been especially successful, for we still lack a plausible account of inter-theoretical explanat…Read more
  •  2
    Android epistemology: Computation, artificial intelligence
    In Merrilee H. Salmon, John Earman, Clark Glymour & James G. Lennox (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Hackett Publishing Company. pp. 364. 1992.
  •  10
    Kevin T. Kelly, Cory Juhl and Clark Glymour. Reliability, Realism, and Relativism
  •  7
    Learning the structure of deterministic systems
    In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal learning: psychology, philosophy, and computation, Oxford University Press. pp. 231--240. 2007.
  •  2
    A Mind Is a Terrible Thing to Waste (review)
    Philosophy of Science 66 (3). 1999.
    Jaegwon Kim's Mind in a Physical World is an argument about mental causation that provides both a metaphysical theory and a lucid commentary on contemporary philosophical views. While I strongly recommend Kim's book to anyone interested in the subject, my endorsement is not unconditional, because I cannot make the same recomendation of the subject itself. Considering arguments of Davidson, Putnam, Burge, Block, and Kim himself, I conclude that the subject turns on a variety of implausible but re…Read more
  •  17
    Revisions of bootstrap testing
    Philosophy of Science 50 (4): 626-629. 1983.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use.
  •  12
    We believe in freedom of the will so that we can learn
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5): 661-662. 2004.
    The central theoretical issue of Wegner's book is: Why do we have the illusion of conscious will? I suggest that learning requires belief in the autonomy of action. You should believe in freedom of the will because if you have it you're right, and if you don't have it you couldn't have done otherwise anyway. —Sam Buss (Lecture at University of California, San Diego, 2000).
  •  3
    Review: A Mind Is a Terrible Thing to Waste (review)
    Philosophy of Science 66 (3). 1999.
    Jaegwon Kim's Mind in a Physical World is an argument about mental causation that provides both a metaphysical theory and a lucid commentary on contemporary philosophical views. While I strongly recommend Kim's book to anyone interested in the subject, my endorsement is not unconditional, because I cannot make the same recomendation of the subject itself. Considering arguments of Davidson, Putnam, Burge, Block, and Kim himself, I conclude that the subject turns on a variety of implausible but re…Read more
  •  4
    These are chapters from a book forthcoming from MIT Press. Comments to the author at [email protected] would be most welcome. Still time for changes.
  •  5
    The sum rule is well-confirmed
    Philosophy of Science 44 (1): 86-94. 1977.
    Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker's well-known argument against hidden variable theories for quantum mechanics is also an argument against the possibility of quantum systems having, simultaneously, precise values for all of the dynamical quantities associated with such systems. Devices for defeating the argument were in the literature even before its publication, but recently Arthur Fine has raised a new difficulty. Fine points out that Kochen and Specker's argument requires the following principle…Read more
  •  2
    This essay review, originally presented an APA symposium on Alberto Coffa's The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, argues that the logical tradition Coffa studied, while embedded in neo and anti-Kantianism, entirely missed the more lasting developments in psychology that Kant provoked.
  •  4
    What Is Going on Inside the Arrows? Discovering the Hidden Springs in Causal Models
    with Alexander Murray-Watters
    Philosophy of Science 82 (4): 556-586. 2015.
    Using Gebharter’s representation, we consider aspects of the problem of discovering the structure of unmeasured submechanisms when the variables in those submechanisms have not been measured. Exploiting an early insight of Sober’s, we provide a correct algorithm for identifying latent, endogenous structure—submechanisms—for a restricted class of structures. The algorithm can be merged with other methods for discovering causal relations among unmeasured variables, and feedback relations between m…Read more
  •  25
    sities. TETRAD II discovers a class of possible causal structures of a system from a data set containing measurements of the system variables. The signi cance of learning the causal structure of a system is that it allows for predicting the e ect of interventions into the system, crucial in policy making. Our data sets contained information on 204 U.S. national universities, collected by the US News and World Report magazine for the purpose of college ranking in 1992 and 1993. One apparently rob…Read more
  •  19
    We applied TETRAD II, a causal discovery program developed in Carnegie Mellon University’s Department of Philosophy, to a database containing information on 204 U.S. colleges, collected by the US News and World Report magazine for the purpose of college ranking. Our analysis focuses on possible causes of low freshmen retention in U.S. colleges. TETRAD II finds a set of causal structures that are compatible with the data.
  •  14
    Two Flagpoles Are More Paradoxical than One
    Philosophy of Science 45 (1). 1978.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use.
  •  14
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use.
  •  4
    We describe the (enormous) size of the search space for Dynamic Casual Models and generalizations of them
  •  1
    Theory and Evidence
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (3): 314-318. 1981.