Alberto Cordero

GRW models of the physical world are criticized in the literature for involving wave function "tails" that allegedly create fatal interpretive problems and even compromise standard arithmetic. I find such objections both unfair and misguided. But not all is well with the GRW approach. One complaint I articulate in this paper does not have to do with tails as such but with the specific way in which past physical structures linger forever in the total GRW wave function. By pushing the total proposal towards either the "Many Worlds" approach or the Bohmian approach, this feature diminishes extant GRW claims to preferability. I suggest, however, that the problem here is just an artifact of the particular and ultimately optional genre of collapse mechanism chosen by GRW.

Philosophers of science disagree on the extent to which epistemology transcends the social sphere in mature branches of science. In this paper I suggest a way of vindicating a key aspect of the transcendence thesis without questioning the social nature of science. Such vindication requires epistemological autonomy to prevail along channels having to do with (1) selection of research goals, (2) use of human subjects and public resources in research, (3) social interventions aimed at helping science fulfill its epistemic goals, and (4) social interventions aimed at helping people and the community protect themselves from harmful scientific activity. This paper focuses on type (3), specifically on social pressure to diversify the points of view represented in scientific research. My exploration proceeds by contrasting two case studies involving pluralist enrichment of scientific research. Both encompass epistemological reform. In one (Feminist Biology) reform is pushed largely from outside the scientific sphere; in the other (Einstein's development of Special Relativity) reform originates largely from within. Examination of these cases shows why general pluralist arguments fail and also why social intervention in epistemological matters is a misguided activity - or so I argue.

Recent attempts to turn Standard Quantum Theory into a coherent representational system have improved markedly over previous offerings. Important questions about the nature of material systems remain open, however, as current theorizing effectively resolves into a multiplicity of incompatible statements about the nature of physical systems. Specifically, the most cogent proposals to date land in effective empirical equivalence, reviving old anti-realist fears about quantum physics. In this paper such fears are discussed and found unsound. It is argued that nothing of global skeptical or agnostic significance follows from the kind of underdetermination presently encountered in fundamental quantum theory. The case is instructive, however, for what it shows about the characteristics and prospects of scientific realism as a perspective in contemporary philosophy of science.

Las interpretaciónes de la física cuántica de Everett-DeWitt hablan de una multiplicidad de mundos físicamente coexistenrtes. Éstas imaginativas reacciones a los problemas conceptuales de la mecánica cuántica estándar forman una família de propuestas de “universos múltiples” que, sin pleno éxito, han sido tachadas de incoherentes.Everett-DeWitt interpretations of quantum physics speak of a multiplicity of physically coexisting worlds. These imaginative reactions to the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics form a family of physicalist “many-worlds” proposals that have been variously dismissed as “incoherent”, so far without full success. A renewed charge by Hilary Putnam now seems to pose deeper trouble for PMW. In a recent paper, he seizes on “Schrödinger’s cat” situations to expose how PMW relativization of actuality and basic combinatorics jointly ruin probabilistic talk. Putnam focuses on confirmation and luck. His case against PMW is thought-provoking but also questionable, or so I suggest in this paper. First I argue that, as presented, Putnam’s charge doesn’t go through. I then consider his argument proper. According to Putnam, experimental DeWittians must count themselves as “lucky” in a seriously incoherent sense. I consider his take on “luck” and deny that defenders of PMW need to so regard themselves. Although extravagant, their position cannot be fruitfully dismissed as incoherent on metascientific grounds. Indeed it attests to the way science rationally helps the imagination to grow.

According to an old way of thinking, any leve! of problematicity with respect to truth or theory dependence suffices to spoil the objectivity of a proposal. No credible discourse complies with such restrictions. Far from compromising the existence of knowledge, correct and incorrect, rational and nonrational ideas, however. the said old way of thinking is simply incapable of representing the cognitive achievements that we actually have. This paper discusses a contemporary way of approaching the difference between ideas of high and low descriptive quality in terms of epistemological criteria that prevail in the most rigorous and reliable scientific practices.

Some thinkers distrust Darwinist explorations of complex human behaviors, particularly investigations into possible differences in valued skills between genders, races or classes. Such projects, it is claimed, tend to have adverse effects on people who are already disadvantaged. A recent argument by Philip Kitcher both clarifies and generalizes this charge to cover a whole genre of scientific projects. In this paper I try to spell out and analyze Kitcher's argument. The argument fails, I suggest, because some of its key premises fail to convince. My analysis focuses on relevant facts about the role of inquiry in fallibilist contexts, the texture of belief in contemporary natural science, and the moral dimension of scientific research.