Leila Haaparanta

At the turn of the century, Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl both participated in the discussion concerning the foundations of logic and mathematics. Since the 1960s, comparisons have been made between Frege's semantic views and Husserl's theory of intentional acts. In quite recent years, new approaches to the two philosophers' views have appeared. This collection of articles opens with the first English translation of Dagfinn Føllesdal's early classic on Husserl and Frege of 1958. The book brings together a number of new contributions by well-known authors and gives a survey of recent developments in the field. It shows that Husserl's thought is coming to occupy a central role in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, as well as in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The work is primarily meant for philosophers, especially for those working on the problems of language, logic, mathematics, and mind. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced courses in philosophy.

: In his paper "Explanation of Curiosity the First" Charles Peirce describes Euclid's procedure in proving theorems. Euclid first presents his theorem in general terms and then translates it into singular terms. Peirce pays attention to the fact that the generality of the statement is not lost by that move. The next step is construction, which is followed by demonstration. Finally the ergo-sentence repeats the original general proposition. Peirce lays much emphasis on the distinction between corollarial and theorematic reasoning in geometry. He takes an argument to be corollarial if no auxiliary construction is needed. For Peirce, construction is "the principal theoric step" of the demonstration. Peirce also stresses that it is the observation of diagrams that is essential to all reasoning and that even if no auxiliary constructions are made, there is always the step from a general to a singular statement in deductive reasoning; that means introducing a kind of diagram to reasoning.This paper seeks to argue for two theses. One is that the way of thinking of reasoning which stresses the role of observation is essential to Peirce's discovery of the new logic. The other is that Peirce wants to consider both logical reasoning and philosophical thinking in general via the model of geometry. However, it is argued in this paper that it is the model of problematic analysis in geometry that is the most important for Peirce when he discovers the new structure of propositions. Moreover, this paper seeks to show that this very feature in Peirce's thought connects him with philosophers and logicians who emphasise the role of praxis instead of theoretic contemplation and that one who wants to reconstruct Peirce's metaphilosophical views must pay special attention to the model of problematic analysis.Key-words: construction; demonstration; corollarial and theorematic reasoning; diagrams.Resumo: Em seu artigo "Explanation of Curiosity the First", Charles Peirce descreve o procedimento de Euclides para demonstrar teoremas. Euclides primeiramente apresenta seu teorema em termos gerais, e então o traduz para termos singulares. Peirce presta atenção ao fato de que a generalidade do enunciado não é perdida por esse movimento. O próximo passo é a construção, que é seguida pela demonstração. Finalmente, a sentença-ergo repete a proposição geral original. Peirce dá bastante ênfase à distinção entre o raciocínio corolarial e o teoremático em geometria. Ele considera um argumento como corolarial se nenhuma construção auxiliar se fizer necessária. Para Peirce, a construção é "o principal passo teórico" da demonstração. Peirce também enfatiza que a observação de diagramas é essencial para todo raciocínio e que, mesmo se não são feitas construções auxiliares, há sempre o passo de um enunciado geral para o particular no raciocínio dedutivo; o que significa introduzir um tipo de diagrama no raciocínio.Este artigo procura defender duas teses. A primeira, que a maneira de pensar o raciocínio que enfatiza o papel da observação é essencial para a descoberta da nova lógica por Peirce. A outra, que Peirce deseja considerar tanto o raciocínio lógico quanto o pensamento filosófico em geral pelo modelo da geometria. Entretanto, defende-se neste artigo que o modelo de análise problemática em geometria é o mais importante para Peirce, quando ele descobre a nova estrutura das proposições. Este artigo procura mostrar, ainda, que é exatamente essa característica do pensamento de Peirce que o liga aos filósofos e lógicos que enfatizam o papel da práxis em vez da contemplação teórica, e que quem deseje reconstruir as visões metafilosóficas de Peirce deve prestar atenção especial ao modelo da análise problemática.Palavras-chave: construção, demonstração, raciocínios corolarial e teoremático, diagrama.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges. Ein Kommentar, mit den Texten des Vorworts zu Grundgesetze der Arithmetik und der Logischen Untersuchungen I–IVLeila HaaparantaWolfgang Künne. Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges. Ein Kommentar, mit den Texten des Vorworts zu Grundgesetze der Arithmetik und der Logischen Untersuchungen I–IV. RoteReihe 30. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 2010. Pp. 840. Paper, €29.80.Frege’s thought has been a permanent point of interest among philosophers for several decades. In the late sixties a few philosophers, such as Christian Thiel and Ignacio Angelelli, published studies on Frege’s logic, semantics, and metaphysics. In 1973 Michael Dummett’s work on Frege’s philosophy of language appeared, which held the stage for a long time. It presented Frege as a predecessor, even as a representative, of the analytic tradition. New approaches came up in the late 1970s and early 1980s, such as Hans Sluga’s work in 1980 and other studies, which paid special attention to Frege’s German background, where Kant played a significant role. Several scholars, including Michael Dummett, started to dig into Frege’s background. Positions varied; some studied Frege’s background in order to show that there is nothing that could help us understand his philosophical insights; others found the origins of his philosophical and logical ideas precisely in his background and philosophical environment, in such philosophers as Leibniz, Kant, Trendelenburg, and Lotze.After a few somewhat more quiet years, Frege scholarship expanded after 2000. A number of books have appeared that discuss Frege in the analytic context and also seek [End Page 507] to find more details about his philosophical sources. Wolfgang Künne’s work is a most welcome contribution to contemporary scholarship in the field. Lothar Kreiser’s Gottlob Frege: Leben—Werk—Zeit (2001) has already been available, and interpretations of Frege’s philosophy as well as editions and translations of his books contain short biographies. Still, because of its special composition, Künne’s work serves to fill a gap in the scholarship and significantly contributes to what is known about Frege’s logic and philosophy.The volume consists of three parts. First, there is an extensive biography (about 50 pages) of Frege that places Frege’s thought in its historical context and also contextualizes those of his articles that are included in the work. The main projects Frege pursued, most notably the project of logicism, receive proper attention in the first part of the volume. The four texts that are included in the volume are the Preface of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I (1893) and the three logical investigations that were published during Frege’s lifetime, namely “Der Gedanke” (1918), “Die Verneinung” (1919), and “Gedankengefüge” (1923), which were originally published in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. Künne has also included a posthumously published text, “Logische Allgemeinheit,” in the volume, as that fragment, which was not written before 1923, was intended to be a fourth logical investigation. The five texts written by Frege that are included in the edition discuss topics that we would now call philosophical logic, such as meaning, reference, and truth, although they also study themes that we would include in ontology and the philosophy of mind. The title of the volume is thus sufficiently motivated.Frege’s texts take up about 100 pages of the volume, while the commentary is about 600 pages. The book also contains an appendix on Bolzano and Frege, where Künne pays attention to similarities between the two logicians and philosophers but also shows his skepticism about the thesis that Frege had read Bolzano. Apart from this position, Künne prefers to read Frege’s texts closely and inform his reader of historical and philological matters rather than take part in any heated debates concerning interpretations; his own positions become visible only indirectly, through the extensive footnotes. The work also contains a very useful bibliography and indexes of names and subjects.The book is extremely rich. If one, for example, wishes to know more about the views of Frege’s German contemporaries, about the standpoints that Russell or Wittgenstein had on Fregean topics, or about the arguments of Frege scholars, one can find...