Peter Simpson

As its title implies, this book is meant to give a new foundation to moral philosophy. In the sense meant, a foundation is a cognitive grounding. Lee is opposing the various non-naturalist 'volitionalisms' that have proved so influential in recent moral philosophy. The burden of her book is to show that the non-naturalist claim that there is no grounding for values in facts is unwarranted. This claim is due, she says, to positivism and empiricism and the associated contention that knowledge is only possible on the basis of strict deductions or strict implications from evidence. If evidence E does not strictly imply assertion A, then A is irrational and unjustified. But to maintain this, says Lee, is to condemn oneself to absurdity. Strict implication does not in fact obtain in any sphere of cognitive discourse, so if moral claims are irrational because they lack strict implication from evidence, then claims in many other spheres are irrational, and this consequence is absurd. Therefore, she says, people should cease finding fault with moral claims as if they were somehow uniquely deficient in this respect.

O tratado de Górgias sobre o nada é dividido por meio da prova de três teses diferentes: 1) que o nada é ou existe; 2) que mesmo que haja algo, não pode ser conhecido; 3) que mesmo que pudesse ser conhecido, não poderia ser comunicado a outrem. Estas teses são tão opostas a Parmênides quanto qualquer tese poderia sê-lo. O tratado de Górgias é uma proeza da polêmica antiparmenidiana. Sua dialética também é uma façanha ao reduzir algo ao absurdo, porque as premissas de que Górgias se utiliza para derrubar Parmênides são tomadas do próprio Parmênides ou da escola parmenidiana. Ademais, e pela mesma razão, os argumentos de Górgias não podem ser derrubados sem abrir mão da tese de Parmênides, de que o ser é uno. Que o ser não é uno é a própria condição de uma metafísica sadia. Por esta razão, que não por outra qualquer, Górgias, e não Parmênides, merece ser lembrado como o primeiro metafísico

Introduction Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’s Republic and Laws in the second book of his Politics have appeared to most commentators to be signally unconvincing. They seem to miss the point, beg the question, distort the sense or focus on the merely trivial. As one translator has put it, Aristotle is ‘puzzlingly unsympathetic’, ‘obtuse’ and ‘rather perverse’ as a critic of Plato.1 But while many accept this judgement few draw attention to the implications. These criticisms are one of the few cases in the Aristotelian corpus where we also have the original works of the philosopher being criticised. They constitute a test- case to determine Aristotle’s fairness in transmitting and criticising the thought of others. If he does this so badly in the case of Plato where he can be checked, we must suppose the same in the case of other philosophers where he cannot. The significance of this result for our study of the Pre-Socratics, for instance, where Aristotle is usually our best authority, needs no stressing. So some serious re-examination of these chapters from the Politics would seem to be in order. For reasons of space I must limit myself here to the criticisms of common wives and children in the Republic. Aristotle's Criticism of Socrates' Communism of Wives and Children. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274037904_Aristotle%27s_Criticism_of_Socrates%27_Communism_of_Wives_and_Children [accessed Aug 12, 2017].