Christian Nadeau

In this article, I wish to show the importance of the consequentialist method for the realisation of the ideal of non-domination. If, as stated by Philip Pettit, consequentialist ethics helps to better conceive republican political institutions, we then have to see how the fundamental principles of republican liberty can meet the norms traditionally associated with consequentialism. After a brief presentation of consequentialism and republican liberty (as Pettit defines it), I criticize the idea that liberty as non-domination could be included in a bundle of goods that we seek to maximize. Next, I argue that we should reject the maximization of liberty as non-domination when this concept is considered as an absolute. Finally, I explore the idea of liberty as a condition for other goods, where liberty is still taken in the republican sense. These three theses are all rejected by demonstrating that the maximization of republican liberty is not really the maximization of liberty itself, but the maximization of protections granted to the individuals with the aim of defending their liberty

Cet article défend la thèse suivant laquelle le républicanisme de Machiavel doit être pensé dans le cadre théorique des tumulti, c’est-à-dire des conflits entre les grands — qui veulent dominer— et le peuple — qui veut être libre. Cela signifie d’abord que le républicanisme de Machiavel ne présuppose aucune conception compréhensive de la liberté politique ni de quelque vision du bien que ce soit. La valeur normative de la thèse du conflit tient en ce que les dissensions entre les groupes sociaux sont garants de la liberté politique et de la neutralité axiologique des institutions qui favoriseront cette liberté. Cela signifie ensuite, mais il s’agit en réalité de la même affirmation, que la pensée politique de Machiavel ne doit pas être interprétée en fonction des paramètres de l’humanisme civique, qui est une forme de néo-aristotélisme sur le plan politique et éthique et dont on associe trop souvent et trop facilement les thèses au républicanisme sous prétexte qu’il en est une des origines.This article defends the claim that Machiavelli’s republicanism should be approached via the theoretical framework of tumulti, that is, the conflicts among the powerful “who want to dominate” and the people “who wants to be free”. It means that Machiavelli’s republicanism presupposes neither a comprehensive conception of political freedom, nor any vision of what the good is. The normative value of the conflict thesis lies in the fact that social dissent between the social groups secures the political freedom and the axiological neutrality of the institutions that promote this freedom. It means therefore — and it is in reality the same assertion — that Machiavelli’s political thought should not be interpreted as related to some form of civic humanism, that is, a neo-Aristotelian conception of ethics and politics, and which we too easily associate with republicanism