Rudolf Bernet

Après avoir donné une idée générale du processus d’individuation chez Husserl, l’étude analyse minutieusement la manière dont la temporalité propre aux actes de la perception interne et externe, du ressouvenir et de la phantasia constitue, d’après les Manuscrits de Bernau, l’individualité de l’objet intentionnel. Une attention toute particulière est accordée à ce qui distingue les objets fictifs des objets idéaux et qui permet de leur attribuer une forme spécifique d’individuation. L’étude apporte également des éclaircissements en ce qui concerne la phénoménologie transcendantale dans son rapport à l’ontologie.

Philosophers have thought more about the nature of thinking than about anything else. After Plato and Aristotle, philosophers’ main concern was to promote good, that is, correct, thinking. Because correct thinking was achieved best in propositional statements, thinking became a matter of logic, and logic became a discipline dealing with the formulation of true predicative sentences.In the twentieth century, many philosophers expressed their dissatisfaction with this view. Some, such as Heidegger, have pointed to the ontological presuppositions of a logic that makes truth a matter of correspondence between predicative sentences and the reality of states of affairs. Other philosophers, such as Deleuze, have..

Freud and especially Lacan understand the sexual identity of the human subject as an effect of a law. The article emphasizes that this symbolic law is arbitrary and it sketches the consequences of this insight for both a symbolic determination of the sexual difference and of the sexual interaction among different sexual desires. When the sexual difference is reduced to a dual opposition (suspended in sexual intercourse) and when the sexual desire is understood as a conscious straining after the appropriate and attainable object, then the symbolic identity of the desiring subject is misunderstood and replaced by an imaginary presentation of it. Traditional philosophy and contemporary pornography are examples of such a misunderstanding : they both try to overcome the impossibility to fully understand a deferring difference and to avoid the symbolic dependency on a foreign desire that cannot be controlled.

While sublimation is not the first word in psychoanalysis, it nevertheless constitutes the final aim of psychoanalytic thought in both its clinical and theoretical orientations. Indeed, if psychoanalysis is primarily a practice whose aim is to alleviate a patient’s sufferings, and if these sufferings are largely the result of a conflict between the exigencies of an individual’s drives and the necessities of a civilized social life, then effective therapeutic action presupposes some knowledge of the way in which such a conflict might be resolved.Yet the concept of sublimation not only exhibits the ultimate horizon, the aim or even the ethical norm of therapeutic action, it also provides a striking outline of the conception which psychoanalytic theory has of the human being. Sublimation cannot be understood without a previous understanding of such key psychoanalytic concepts as the unconscious, drive and desire, sexuality and pleasure, dream and reality. Tying together the ultimate ends of psychoanalytic therapy with the first principles of ‘Freudian metapsychology’, a study of the notion of sublimation invites us not only to take an overall view of psychoanalytic theory, but also to test its coherence.It would not, then, be an exaggeration to say that the value of psychoanalysis as theory and as practice depends essentially on its ability to think sublimation and, more specifically, to think the relation between the economy of a singular libidinal body and the demands of a cultural life accomplished within a symbolic field transcending the individual.

Eine phänomenologische Analyse des Selbstbewusstseins erbringt den Nachweis, dass die Selbsterfahrung stets eine Erfahrung des Selbstverlusts impliziert. Dieser Befund beruht auf der richtig verstandenen Intentionalität bzw. Transzendenz des Subjekts. Diese These wird im vorliegenden Artikel vor allem mit dem Hinweis auf die Phänomene des moralischen Gewissens, der synthetischen Funktion des Ich, der differenziellen Struktur von Selbstbezug und Selbstrepräsentation, sowie der leiblich bestimmten, affektiven Selbsterfahrung illustriert. Bereits bei Kant ist die Selbstgesetzgebung des moralischen Subjekts die Folge eines Aufrufs durch das Gesetz. Autonomie schliesst somit eine besondere Form der vernunftmässigen Heteronomie nicht aus. Die ursprüngliche Form der moralischen Selbsterfahrung liegt nicht in der ausdrücklichen Ausrichtung des Subjekts auf das Gesetz, sondern im Hören auf das Gesetz, nicht in der allgemeinen Rechtfertigung des eigenen Handelns, sondern im individuellen Gewissen. Unter Hinweis auf Heidegger, Freud und Lacan wird anschliessend aufgezeigt, dass das Subjekt für sich selbst ein Fremdes bleibt. Selbsterfahrung bedeutet Erfahrung der eigenen Verlorenheit im alltäglichen Besorgen, in unbewussten Wünschen und in der Anonymität der Sprache. Selbsterfahrung impliziert somit die Aufgabe einer Selbstfindung und einer Vereinigung mit sich selbst. Es handelt sich dabei jedoch um eine unendliche Aufgabe, da jede Selbsterfahrung des endlichen Subjekts einen neuen Selbstverlust impliziert. Das Selbst des Subjekts ist somit eine Einheit bzw. Identität, welche die Differenz mit sich selbst nicht aufhebt, sondern stets von neuem ins Spiel bringt. Diese differenzielle Struktur der Selbstrepräsentation und die darin implizierte Form der Selbstverantwortung spielt vor allem im Werk von Derrida eine wichtige Rolle. Jede subjektive Selbsterfahrung ist in der menschlichen Affektivität verwurzelt. Ich erfahre mich selbst, wenn ich getroffen und berührt werde und zwar nicht durch mich selbst, sondern durch ein anderes das mich be-trifft. Im Gefühl und in der Rührung entsteht ein leibliches Selbst, das von je her durch das andere angesprochen und in Anspruch genommen wird. Dies gilt nicht nur für die Sexualität, sondern für alle anderen, bereits erwähnten Formen der Selbsterfahrung einschliesslich das moralische Gewissen. Der Leib als „Organ des Willens "ist zugleich und zuerst ein sinnlicher Leib.

Husserl's phenomenology of the body constantly faces issues of demarcation: between phenomenology and ontology, soul and spirit, consciousness and brain, conditionality and causality. It also shows that Husserl was eager to cross the borders of transcendental phenomenology when the phenomena under investigation made it necessary. Considering the details of his description of bodily sensations and bodily behaviour from a Merleau-Pontian perspective allows one also to realise how Husserl (unlike Heidegger) fruitfully explores a phenomenological field located between a science of pure consciousness and the natural sciences. A phenomenological discussion of naturalism thus cannot limit itself to the task of discrimination, it must attempt to integrate what an eidetic analysis has separated: inside and outside, here and there, first-person and third-person perspective, motivation and causality. Husserl's phenomenology of the body thus shows that dualism is at best a methodological but never an ontological option for the mind-body problem.

While sublimation is not the first word in psychoanalysis, it nevertheless constitutes the final aim of psychoanalytic thought in both its clinical and theoretical orientations. Indeed, if psychoanalysis is primarily a practice whose aim is to alleviate a patient’s sufferings, and if these sufferings are largely the result of a conflict between the exigencies of an individual’s drives and the necessities of a civilized social life, then effective therapeutic action presupposes some knowledge of the way in which such a conflict might be resolved.Yet the concept of sublimation not only exhibits the ultimate horizon, the aim or even the ethical norm of therapeutic action, it also provides a striking outline of the conception which psychoanalytic theory has of the human being. Sublimation cannot be understood without a previous understanding of such key psychoanalytic concepts as the unconscious, drive and desire, sexuality and pleasure, dream and reality. Tying together the ultimate ends of psychoanalytic therapy with the first principles of ‘Freudian metapsychology’, a study of the notion of sublimation invites us not only to take an overall view of psychoanalytic theory, but also to test its coherence.It would not, then, be an exaggeration to say that the value of psychoanalysis as theory and as practice depends essentially on its ability to think sublimation and, more specifically, to think the relation between the economy of a singular libidinal body and the demands of a cultural life accomplished within a symbolic field transcending the individual.

Relying on Husserl as well as on the reflections by Merleau-Ponty on Cézanne, Henry on Kandinsky and Deleuze on Bacon, this essay sketches some basic problems that arise in a phenomenological account of non-figurative painting. An investigation of the distinction between phenomenological and pictorial perception, of the transposition of the painter’s mode of perception into a painted image, and of the expressive force of paintings inevitably confronts one with the enigma of the appearing of something invisible. The essay proceeds in three steps. The first step describes pictorial perception in terms of a ‘seeing according to’. Such a mode of perception pays attention to visual ambiguities, to the ‘gaze of things’ and to the conditions of visibility that are ordinarily overlooked. The second step moves on to the issue of the transposition of a pictorial perception in a painted image. Deleuze’s account of “manipulated chance” proves to be very helpful here. In the final step, Henry’s and Deleuze’s emphasis on the painting’s expression of totally invisible ‘forces’ is discussed.

Language and imagination play a prominent role in Merleau-Ponty’s early reflections on literature. The “literary use of language” is opposed to usual or ordinary language, and it is also assigned the task of rejuvenating the latter. Merleau-Ponty is here openly inspired by Saussure and more secretly by Bergson. Poetic language is said to effect a coherent deformation of a linguistic code and to liberate signifiers from their subordination under a subjective meaning that directly refers to external objects. Literature also illustrates, in exemplary fashion, the creative power of imagination and the effective force of fictions. This is where the discussion with Sartre comes into the picture. The article explores, in particular, what personal identity and the meaning of real facts owe not only to language but also to the imagination of possibilities. It further investigates the different notions of truth that apply to literary works of art. Literature is also shown to undermine the conception of the relation between fact and meaning, actuality and possibility, reality and fiction, truth and semblance in terms of dual oppositions. Most importantly, literary fictions and narratives can make a real change in the life of writers and readers by unfolding their unrealized personal potentialities, by refining their emotional sensibility, and by distancing them from themselves. In all this, an imaginative mode of ‘projection’ plays a central role. Le langage et l’imagination jouent un rôle de premier plan dans les réflexions de Merleau-Ponty sur la littérature. « L’usage littéraire du langage » est opposé au langage usuel ou ordinaire, et la tâche lui est également dévolue de rajeunir ce dernier. Merleau-Ponty s’inspire ouvertement de Saussure et plus secrètement de Bergson. Le langage poétique est dit effectuer une déformation cohérente du code linguistique et libérer les signifiants de leur subordination à une signification subjective qui réfère directement aux objets externes. La littérature illustre également, de manière exemplaire, la puissance créatrice de l’imagination et la force effective de la fiction. Ici la discussion avec Sartre entre en jeu. Mon article explore en particulier ce que l’identité personnelle et la signification des faits réels doit non seulement au langage, mais également à l’imagination des possibilités. Il discute également les différentes notions de vérité qui s’appliquent aux oeuvres d’art littéraires. Je montre aussi que la littérature empêche de concevoir comme des oppositions duelles les relations entre fait et signification, actualité et possibilité, réalité et fiction, vérité et vraisemblance. Par dessus tout, les fictions et narrations littéraires peuvent provoquer de réels changements dans la vie des écrivains et des lecteurs en déployant leurs potentialités personnelles non réalisées, en affinant leur sensibilité émotionnelle et en se distanciant d’eux-mêmes. Dans tout cela, le mode imaginatif de la projection joue un rôle central.Linguaggio e immaginazione rivestono un ruolo centrale nelle prime riflessioni di Merleau-Ponty sulla letteratura. L’“uso letterario del linguaggio” viene opposto al linguaggio ordinario o quotidiano e al primo viene inoltre assegnato l’incarico di rinnovare il secondo; in questo, Merleau-Ponty si ispira apertamente a Saussure e, in modo meno manifesto, a Bergson. Il linguaggio poetico è ritenuto in grado di imprimere una deformazione coerente a un determinato codice linguistico e di liberare i significanti dalla loro subordinazione a un significato soggettivo che si riferisce direttamente a oggetti esterni. La letteratura, inoltre, illustra in modo esemplare il potere creativo dell’immaginazione e la forza effettiva della finzione letteraria. È qui che entra in gioco la discussione con Sartre. Questo articolo esplora, in particolare, ciò che l’identità personale e il significato dei fatti reali debba non solamente al linguaggio, ma anche all’immaginazione delle possibilità; indaga inoltre le diverse nozioni di verità che possono essere applicate all’opera d’arte letteraria. L’articolo mostra poi come la letteratura possa mettere in discussione il carattere di opposizione binaria della relazione tra fatto e significato, attualità e possibilità, realtà e finzione, verità e verisimiglianza. In maniera significativa, le finzioni e le narrazioni letterarie possono cambiare la vita di scrittori e lettori svelando le loro potenzialità personali irrealizzate, raffinando la loro sensibilità emotiva e ponendoli a distanza da se stessi. In tutto questo, una modalità immaginativa di “proiezione” svolge un ruolo di primaria importanza.

The article approaches the work of Van Breda and De Waelhens with respect to the question of how philosophical thought relates to the problems arising in natural life. Van Breda’s main contribution to philosophy is related to the exceptional natural skills he showed in his rescuing of E. Husserl’s Nachlass and his founding of the Husserl Archives in Leuven. It is lesser known that he also brought E. Husserrs widow to Leuven and rescued her from deportation by the German occupation of Belgium during World War II. Extensive excerpts from Malvine Husserl’s private correspondence demonstrate her admiration for and gratitude towards Van Breda. This correspondence also gives us a good idea of her daily life during the seven years that she spent in Leuven, her strong character, and the reasons behind her conversion to Catholicism. Less anchored in natural life than Van Breda, De Waelhens nevertheless claimed that philosophy’s main task is to shed light on the problems of bodily human existence in its social dimensions and its relation to a linguistically-structured world. This led De Waelhens into a study first of Heidegger, then to Merleau-Ponty, Hegel and Marx and, finally, to psychoanalysis. But his entire work remained dedicated to a reflection on the relation between “philosophy and natural experiences‘. He understood this relation in strongly dialectical terms: philosophy must give natural life a better understanding of itself in order to allow it to play the role of a critical counter-balance to philosophical speculation. The article concludes with some of the author’s personal reflections on what philosophy can and cannot do in order to improve natural human life.

La double expérience que chacun de nous a des mouvements de son corps – comme objet mondain et comme organe de sa volonté – atteste, au sein de la métaphysique de Schopenhauer, la provenance de tout objet de représentation de la Volonté en soi. Nos « mouvements » charnels se prêtent cependant encore à des modalités diverses, selon qu’ils sont volontaires ou involontaires, et selon que la volonté y est appréhendée à travers une perception interne de ses « actes » successifs ou à travers des sensations de plaisir et de douleur se rapportant à des « désirs » conscients ou inconscients. Formulé dans un langage freudien, la volonté-pulsion inconsciente se phénoménalise selon le double régime de la représentation et de l’affect, c’est-à-dire au sein d’un corps propre dont le principe de réalité et le principe de plaisir se disputent le gouvernement. Cette analyse des comportements corporels humains sert aussi de fondement à la philosophie de la nature de Schopenhauer. De même que nos actes volontaires, tout en se conformant à des « motifs » rationnels, puisent leur énergie dans une pulsion irrationnelle, les mouvements des corps matériels, tout en se conformant aux lois de la physique, restent animés par des « forces naturelles » qu’il faut comprendre comme la présence de la volonté pulsionnelle au sein de la nature. Croisant perspectives métaphysiques, anthropologiques et cosmologiques, l’auteur veut plus particulièrement mettre en lumière que la philosophie de la Volonté de Schopenhauer est la philosophie d’une force pulsionnelle nihiliste, héritière pessimiste du rationalisme leibnizien et visionnaire de la pulsion de mort de Freud. Tout en s’inscrivant dans le sillage kantien, cette philosophie conteste aussi déjà le principe d’une subjectivité originelle au nom du principe d’une vie pulsionnelle anonyme, inconsciente et irrationnelle.