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15On Interpreting Kant's Thinker as Wittgenstein's 'I'Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1): 33-63. 2000.Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the "unknowability" of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison's attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell's linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique's analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic n…Read more
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48Kant versus the Asymmetry DogmaKant Yearbook 5 (1). 2013.One of the most widely accepted contemporary constraints on theories of self-knowledge is that they must account for the very different ways in which cognitive subjects know their own minds and the ways in which they know other minds. Through the influence of Peter Strawson, Kant is often taken to be an original source for this view. I argue that Kant is quite explicit in holding the opposite position. In a little discussed passage in the Paralogisms chapter, he argues that cognitive subjects ha…Read more
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72Kant on the faculty of apperceptionBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (3): 589-616. 2017.Although I begin with a brief look at the idea that as a faculty of mind, apperception must be grounded in some power of the soul, my focus is on claims about the alleged noumenal import of some of Kant’s particular theses about the faculty of apperception: it is inexplicable, immaterial, and can provide evidence that humans are members of the intelligible world. I argue that when the claim of inexplicability is placed in the context of Kant’s standards for transcendental psychological explanati…Read more
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33Review: Falkenstein, Lorne, Kant's Intuitionism (review)Philosophical Review 107 (1): 155-158. 1998.
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |