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11Darwin's Influence on Freud: A Tale of Two Sciences. Lucille B. Ritvo (review)Philosophy of Science 61 (1): 150-151. 1994.
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14Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis. Adolf Grunbaum (review)Philosophy of Science 62 (1): 166-167. 1995.
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81A Kantian Argument for the Formula of HumanityKant Studien 108 (2): 218-246. 2017.Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 2 Seiten: 218-246.
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25Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense" (review)Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (3): 439. 1985.
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4Kant’s Intuitionism (review)Philosophical Review 107 (1): 155-158. 1998.Wonderfully clear, scholarly, and well argued, Kant’s Intuitionism offers a bold new interpretation of the thesis of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Falkenstein reads Kant as a “formal intuitionist.” That is, he takes Kant to have maintained that the forms of intuition, space, and time were given along with sensations. They were neither preexisting representations, nor intellectual or imaginative constructions out of sensations. In this context “given” contrasts with “constructed”; subjects’ repre…Read more
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229Marr’s Computational Theory of VisionPhilosophy of Science 55 (March): 1-24. 1988.David Marr's theory of vision has been widely cited by philosophers and psychologists. I have three projects in this paper. First, I try to offer a perspicuous characterization of Marr's theory. Next, I consider the implications of Marr's work for some currently popular philosophies of psychology, specifically, the "hegemony of neurophysiology view", the theories of Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, and Stephen Stich, and the view that perception is permeated by belief. In the last section, I conside…Read more
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174Narrow taxonomy and wide functionalismPhilosophy of Science 52 (March): 78-97. 1985.Three recent, influential critiques (Stich 1978; Fodor 1981c; Block 1980) have argued that various tasks on the agenda for computational psychology put conflicting pressures on its theoretical constructs. Unless something is done, the inevitable result will be confusion or outright incoherence. Stich, Fodor, and Block present different versions of this worry and each proposes a different remedy. Stich wants the central notion of belief to be jettisoned if it cannot be shown to be sound. Fodor tr…Read more
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22Analyzing ApperceptionIn Gideon Stiening & Udo Thiel (eds.), Johann Nikolaus Tetens : Philosophie in der Tradition des Europäischen Empirismus, De Gruyter. pp. 103-132. 2014.
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4Kant's real selfIn Allen W. Wood (ed.), Self and nature in Kant's philosophy, Cornell University Press. pp. 113--47. 1984.
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22The Trendelenburg Objection: A Century of Misunderstanding Kant's Rejection of MetaphysicsIn Ralph Schumacher, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Volker Gerhardt (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des Ix. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Bd. I: Hauptvorträge. Bd. Ii: Sektionen I-V. Bd. Iii: Sektionen Vi-X: Bd. Iv: Sektionen Xi-Xiv. Bd. V: Sektionen Xv-Xviii, De Gruyter. pp. 599-608. 2001.
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142Kant on self-consciousnessPhilosophical Review 108 (3): 345-386. 1999.The highest principle of Kant’s theoretical philosophy is that all cognition must “be combined in one single self-consciousness”. Elsewhere I have tried to explain why he believed that all cognition must belong to a single self ; here I try to clarify the other half of the doctrine. What led him to the claim that all cognition involved self-consciousness? This question is pressing, because the thesis strikes many as obviously false.
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56Replies to Rödl, Ginsborg, and AllaisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1): 237-247. 2013.
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46Kant's 'I think'In Valerio Hrsg v. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants, De Gruyter. pp. 181. 2008.
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117On Interpreting Kant’s Thinker as Wittgenstein’s ‘I’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1): 33-63. 2000.Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the “unknowability” of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison’s attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell’s linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique’s analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic n…Read more
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101Kant's thinkerOxford University Press. 2011.Overview -- Locke's internal sense and Kant's changing views -- Personal identity amd its problems -- Rationalist metaphysics of mind -- Consciousness, self-consciousness, and cognition -- Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachlass -- A transcendental deduction for a priori concepts -- Synthesis : why and how? -- Arguing for apperception -- The power of apperception -- "I-think" as the destroyer of rational psychology -- Is Kant's theory consistent? -- The normativity objection -- Is Kant's th…Read more
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Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |