-
72Kant on the faculty of apperceptionBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (3): 589-616. 2017.Although I begin with a brief look at the idea that as a faculty of mind, apperception must be grounded in some power of the soul, my focus is on claims about the alleged noumenal import of some of Kant’s particular theses about the faculty of apperception: it is inexplicable, immaterial, and can provide evidence that humans are members of the intelligible world. I argue that when the claim of inexplicability is placed in the context of Kant’s standards for transcendental psychological explanati…Read more
-
33Review: Falkenstein, Lorne, Kant's Intuitionism (review)Philosophical Review 107 (1): 155-158. 1998.
-
33Natural Kinds and Unnatural PersonsPhilosophy 54 (210). 1979.Most people believe that extraterrestrial beings or porpoises or computers could someday be recognized as persons. Given the significant constitutional differences between these entities and ourselves, the general assumption appears to be that ‘person’ is not a natural kind term. David Wiggins offers an illuminating challenge to this popular dogma in ‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: and Men as a Natural Kind’. Wiggins does not claim that ‘person’ actually is a natural kind term; b…Read more
-
22Analyzing ApperceptionIn Udo Thiel & Gideon Stiening (eds.), Johann Nikolaus Tetens : Philosophie in der Tradition des Europäischen Empirismus, De Gruyter. pp. 103-132. 2014.
-
4Kant's real selfIn Allen W. Wood (ed.), Self and nature in Kant's philosophy, Cornell University Press. pp. 113--47. 1984.
-
47Triangulating phenomenal consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 259-260. 1995.This commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal consciousness” may refer to our ability to monitor the rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.
-
139Kant on self-consciousnessPhilosophical Review 108 (3): 345-386. 1999.The highest principle of Kant’s theoretical philosophy is that all cognition must “be combined in one single self-consciousness”. Elsewhere I have tried to explain why he believed that all cognition must belong to a single self ; here I try to clarify the other half of the doctrine. What led him to the claim that all cognition involved self-consciousness? This question is pressing, because the thesis strikes many as obviously false.
-
52Replies to Rödl, Ginsborg, and AllaisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1): 237-247. 2013.
-
46Kant's 'I think'In Valerio Hrsg V. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht Und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants, . pp. 181. 2008.
-
117On Interpreting Kant’s Thinker as Wittgenstein’s ‘I’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1): 33-63. 2000.Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the “unknowability” of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison’s attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell’s linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique’s analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic n…Read more
-
96Kant's thinkerOxford University Press. 2011.Overview -- Locke's internal sense and Kant's changing views -- Personal identity amd its problems -- Rationalist metaphysics of mind -- Consciousness, self-consciousness, and cognition -- Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachlass -- A transcendental deduction for a priori concepts -- Synthesis : why and how? -- Arguing for apperception -- The power of apperception -- "I-think" as the destroyer of rational psychology -- Is Kant's theory consistent? -- The normativity objection -- Is Kant's th…Read more
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |