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19Understanding the First Paralogism: A Friendly DisagreementKantian Review 1-10. forthcoming.My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary …Read more
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19Explaining Freedom in Thought and ActionIn Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 185-208. 2018.
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19On Interpreting Kant’s Thinker as Wittgenstein’s ‘I’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1): 33-63. 2000.Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the “unknowability” of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison’s attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell’s linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique’s analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic n…Read more
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16Kant on Constructing Causal RepresentationsIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier. pp. 1--217. 2004.
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16A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian PsychologyPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 268-271. 1999.
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16Connecting intuitions and concepts at b 160nSouthern Journal of Philosophy 25 (S1): 137-149. 1987.
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15On Interpreting Kant's Thinker as Wittgenstein's 'I'Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1): 33-63. 2000.Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the "unknowability" of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison's attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell's linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique's analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic n…Read more
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14Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis. Adolf Grunbaum (review)Philosophy of Science 62 (1): 166-167. 1995.
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13Arguing for ApperceptionIn Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 189-198. 2013.
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11Discussion: How to reduce a functional psychology?Philosophy of Science 47 (March): 134-140. 1980.
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10Empirical ConsciousnessIn Marcus Willaschek, Jürgen Stolzenberg, Georg Mohr & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant-Lexikon, De Gruyter. 2015.
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6What Can Humans Cognize about the Self from Experience? Comments on Corey Dyck’s “The Development of Kant’s Psychology during the 1770’s”Con-Textos Kantianos 3 345-352. 2016.I agree with Dyck’s basic claim that Kant follows the methodology of Rational Psychology in setting up his critique of it: He starts as it starts, with an existential proposition ‘I think.’ On the other hand, I am not convinced of Dyck’s use of the Dreams essay in establishing a timeline for the development of Kant’s views on inner sense. That essay is evidence that Kant thinks that Schwendenborg’s metaphysics is ungrounded, because he has a crazy sort of inner sense, but it does not show that K…Read more
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5What is Necessary and What is Contingent in Kant’s Empirical Self?Sententiae 43 (1): 8-17. 2024.How does Kant understand the representation of an empirical self? For Kant, the sources of the representation must be both a priori and a posteriori. Several scholars claim that the a priori part of the ‘self’ representation is supplied by the category of ‘substance,’ either a regular substance (Andrew Chignell), a minimal substance (Karl Ameriks) or a substance analog (Katharina Kraus). However, Kant opens the Paralogisms chapter by announcing that there is a thirteenth ‘transcendental’ concept…Read more
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5Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield. 1998.The central project of the Critique of Pure Reason is to answer two sets of questions: What can we know and how can we know it? and What can't we know and why can't we know it? The essays in this collection are intended to help students read the Critique of Pure Reason with a greater understanding of its central themes and arguments, and with some awareness of important lines of criticism of those themes and arguments. Visit our website for sample chapters!
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Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |