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117On Interpreting Kant’s Thinker as Wittgenstein’s ‘I’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1): 33-63. 2000.Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the “unknowability” of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison’s attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell’s linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique’s analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic n…Read more
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101Kant's thinkerOxford University Press. 2011.Overview -- Locke's internal sense and Kant's changing views -- Personal identity amd its problems -- Rationalist metaphysics of mind -- Consciousness, self-consciousness, and cognition -- Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachlass -- A transcendental deduction for a priori concepts -- Synthesis : why and how? -- Arguing for apperception -- The power of apperception -- "I-think" as the destroyer of rational psychology -- Is Kant's theory consistent? -- The normativity objection -- Is Kant's th…Read more
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26Kant on Some Functions of Self ConsciousnessProceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress 1 645-660. 1995.
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22The Trendelenburg Objection: A Century of Misunderstanding Kant's Rejection of MetaphysicsIn Ralph Schumacher, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Volker Gerhardt (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des Ix. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Bd. I: Hauptvorträge. Bd. Ii: Sektionen I-V. Bd. Iii: Sektionen Vi-X: Bd. Iv: Sektionen Xi-Xiv. Bd. V: Sektionen Xv-Xviii, De Gruyter. pp. 599-608. 2001.
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70Kant's epistemological problem and its coherent solutionPhilosophical Perspectives 13 415-441. 1999.
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Scientific understanding and the causal structure of the worldIn Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation, Univ of Minnesota Pr. pp. 410--505. 1989.
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32Freud's Dream: A Complete Interdisciplinary Science of MindPhilosophical Review 103 (3): 549-551. 1994.
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55Connecting intuitions and concepts at B 160nSouthern Journal of Philosophy 25 (S1): 137-149. 1987.
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Narrow Taxonomy and Wide FunctionalismIn Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science, Mit Press. pp. 671--85. 1991.
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16Kant on Constructing Causal RepresentationsIn Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier. pp. 1--217. 2004.
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12Discussion: How to reduce a functional psychology?Philosophy of Science 47 (March): 134-140. 1980.
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19On Interpreting Kant’s Thinker as Wittgenstein’s ‘I’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1): 33-63. 2000.Although both Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the “unknowability” of cognitive subjects, the current practice of assimilating their positions is mistaken. I argue that Allison’s attempt to understand the Kantian self through the early Wittgenstein and McDowell’s linking of Kant and the later Wittgenstein distort rather than illuminate. Against McDowell, I argue further that the Critique’s analysis of the necessary conditions for cognition produces an account of the sources of epistemic n…Read more
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13Arguing for ApperceptionIn Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 189-198. 2013.
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55«Kant's Thinker». An ExpositionRivista di Filosofia 104 (1): 24-50. 2013.Kant's discussion of the relations between cognition and self-consciousness lie at the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason, in the celebrated transcendental deduction. Although this section of Kant's masterpiece is widely believed to contain important insights into cognition and self-consciousness, it has long been viewed as unusually obscure. Many philosophers have tried to avoid the transcendental psychology that Kant employed. By contrast, Patricia Kitcher follows Kant's careful delineation …Read more
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25Kant on Self-ConsciousnessPhilosophical Review 108 (3): 345-386. 1999.The highest principle of Kant’s theoretical philosophy is that all cognition must “be combined in one single self-consciousness”. Elsewhere I have tried to explain why he believed that all cognition must belong to a single self ; here I try to clarify the other half of the doctrine. What led him to the claim that all cognition involved self-consciousness? This question is pressing, because the thesis strikes many as obviously false.
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71The Crucial Relation in Personal IdentityCanadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1): 131-145. 1978.1. What is the Problem of Personal Identity?Locke posed the problem of personal identity in one brief question, “What makes the same person?” This formulation is deceptively simple. My aim is to offer a new interpretation of the problem and to suggest a method for finding a solution.Investigations of personal identity are usually cast in terms of finding the criterion for personal identity. Yet talk of criteria is ambiguous. In one sense of the term, the criterion of personal identity would be s…Read more
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Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |