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30Imagination, experience, and possibilityIn John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley: a tercentennial celebration, Oxford University Press. 1985.
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177XI*—Externalist Explanation1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1): 203-230. 1993.Christopher Peacocke; XI*—Externalist Explanation1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 203–230, https://doi.org/10.
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1Proof and truthIn John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection, Oxford University Press. pp. 165--190. 1993.
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Can a theory of concepts explain the a-priori-a reply to Skorupski, John critical notice of a'study of concepts'International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1): 154-160. 1996.
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1Between instrumentalism and brain-writingIn Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations, Oxford University Press. 1983.
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First-person reference, representational independence, and self-knowledgeIn Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, John Benjamins. 2001.
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117Truly understoodOxford University Press. 2008.A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case stu…Read more
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474Metaphysical necessity: Understanding, truth and epistemologyMind 106 (423): 521-574. 1997.This paper presents an account of the understanding of statements involving metaphysical modality, together with dovetailing theories of their truth conditions and epistemology. The account makes modal truth an objective matter, whilst avoiding both Lewisian modal realism and mind-dependent or expressivist treatments of the truth conditions of modal sentences. The theory proceeds by formulating constraints a world-description must meet if it is to represent a genuine possibility. Modal truth is …Read more
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25'Another I': Representing Conscious States, Perception, and OthersIn Jose Luis Bermudez & José Luis Bermúdez (eds.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?
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19Explaining the apri: The programme of moderate rationalismIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--285. 2000.
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8The property-identity link and its role in understandingIn Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: issues in philosophy and psychology, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--339. 2001.
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17Précis of Being Known_ _*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 636-640. 2002.The topic of Being Known is what I call the Integration Challenge, which is the challenge of providing, for any given domain, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology for that domain. In virtually every domain of thought, it is a substantive task to reconcile our metaphysics and our epistemology of that domain. In some cases, we have an intuitively acceptable metaphysics, but cannot find a plausible epistemology which would allow us knowledge of truths for which that is the right…Read more
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152Descartes DefendedAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 109-125. 2012.Drawing upon a conception of the metaphysics of conscious states and of first-person content, we can argue that Descartes's transition ‘Cogito ergo sum’ is both sound and one he is entitled to make. We can nevertheless formulate a version of Lichtenberg's objection that can still be raised after Bernard Williams's discussion. I argue that this form of Lichtenberg's revenge can also be undermined. In doing so it helps to compare the metaphysics of subjects, worlds and times. The arguments also ap…Read more
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212Joint attention: Its nature, reflexivity, and relation to common knowledgeIn Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds, Oxford University Press. pp. 298-324. 2005.The openness of joint awareness between two or more subjects is a perceptual phenomenon. It involves a certain mutual awareness between the subjects, an awareness that makes reference to that very awareness itself. Properly characterized, such awareness can generate iterated awareness ‘x is aware that y is aware that x is aware...’ to whatever level the subjects can sustain. The openness should not be characterized in terms of Lewis–Schiffer common knowledge, the conditions for which are not met…Read more
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |