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14Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their RelationsPhilosophical Quarterly 36 (143): 278-291. 1986.
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1Free willIn Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press. 1998.
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178XI*—Externalist Explanation1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1): 203-230. 1993.Christopher Peacocke; XI*—Externalist Explanation1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 203–230, https://doi.org/10.
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Understanding and rule-followingIn Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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59Our entitlement to self-knowledge: Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeploymentProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 117-58. 1996.Tyler Burge, Christopher Peacocke; Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 117–158, h.
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160Being knownOxford University Press. 1999.Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.
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18Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind (edited book)British Academy. 1996.What is it to be capable of thoughts about an objective world? What is involved in the unity of consciousness? How is the ability to attribute attitudes to other persons to be understood? The three symposia in this volume develop new approaches to these central questions in the philosophy of mind. The contributors include leading philosophers of the middle and younger generation working in Britain. All the issues discussed have an interdisciplinary dimension, and each symposium contains a contri…Read more
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16Explaining the A PrioriIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--285. 2000.
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5Rule-following: The nature of Wittgenstein's argumentsIn Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, Routledge. pp. 72--95. 1981.
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1511 Theories of Concepts: A Wider TaskIn João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 157. 2001.
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232Justification, realism and the pastMind 114 (455): 639-670. 2005.This paper begins by considering Dummett's justificationist treatment of statements about the past in his book Truth and the Past (2004). Contrary to Dummett's position, there is no way of applying the intuitionistic distinction in the arithmetical case between direct and indirect methods of establishing a content to the case of past-tense statements. Attempts to do so either give the wrong truth conditions, or rely on notions not available to a justificationist position. A better, realistic tre…Read more
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343Implicit conceptions, understanding, and rationalityIn Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Philosophical Issues, Mit Press. pp. 43-88. 2003.
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185Our Entitlement to Self-KnowledgeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 91-116. 1996.Tyler Burge, Christopher Peacocke; Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 91–116, ht.
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108Conceiving of Conscious StatesIn J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2012.For a wide range of concepts, a thinker’s understanding of what it is for a thing to fall under the concept plausibly involves knowledge of an identity. It involves knowledge that the thing has to have the same property as is exemplified in instantiation of the concept in some distinguished, basic instance. This paper addresses the question: can we apply this general model of the role of identity in understanding to the case of subjective, conscious states? In particular, can we explain our unde…Read more
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |