Christopher Peacocke

Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
  • Columbia University
    Department of Philosophy
    Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy
  • Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
    Other (Part-time)
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil
New York City, New York, United States of America
  •  19
    The a priori
    In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
  •  1
    Intention and akrasia
    In Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson: actions and events, Oxford University Press. pp. 69. 1985.
  •  57
    Our entitlement to self-knowledge: Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeployment
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 117-58. 1996.
    Tyler Burge, Christopher Peacocke; Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 117–158, h.
  •  157
    Being known
    Oxford University Press. 1999.
    Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.
  •  18
    What is it to be capable of thoughts about an objective world? What is involved in the unity of consciousness? How is the ability to attribute attitudes to other persons to be understood? The three symposia in this volume develop new approaches to these central questions in the philosophy of mind. The contributors include leading philosophers of the middle and younger generation working in Britain. All the issues discussed have an interdisciplinary dimension, and each symposium contains a contri…Read more
  •  1
    Free will
    In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press. 1998.
  •  142
    Moral Rationalism
    Journal of Philosophy 101 (10): 499-526. 2004.
  •  25
    A Moderate Mentalism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2). 1992.
  •  5
    Rule-following: The nature of Wittgenstein's arguments
    In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, Routledge. pp. 72--95. 1981.
  •  16
    Explaining the A Priori
    In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--285. 2000.
  • The past, necessity, externalism and entitlement
    Philosophical Books 42 106--117. 2001.
  •  12
    Foreword
    Journal of Philosophy 105 (9): 441-452. 2008.
  •  10
    Philosophical Papers by David Lewis (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 82 (1): 42-45. 1985.
  •  623
  •  15
    11 Theories of Concepts: A Wider Task
    In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 157. 2001.
  •  231
    Justification, realism and the past
    Mind 114 (455): 639-670. 2005.
    This paper begins by considering Dummett's justificationist treatment of statements about the past in his book Truth and the Past (2004). Contrary to Dummett's position, there is no way of applying the intuitionistic distinction in the arithmetical case between direct and indirect methods of establishing a content to the case of past-tense statements. Attempts to do so either give the wrong truth conditions, or rely on notions not available to a justificationist position. A better, realistic tre…Read more
  •  184
    Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 91-116. 1996.
    Tyler Burge, Christopher Peacocke; Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 91–116, ht.
  •  51
    Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
    Philosophical Review 93 (2): 263. 1984.
  •  108
    Conceiving of Conscious States
    In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2012.
    For a wide range of concepts, a thinker’s understanding of what it is for a thing to fall under the concept plausibly involves knowledge of an identity. It involves knowledge that the thing has to have the same property as is exemplified in instantiation of the concept in some distinguished, basic instance. This paper addresses the question: can we apply this general model of the role of identity in understanding to the case of subjective, conscious states? In particular, can we explain our unde…Read more
  •  38
    The Identities of Persons
    Philosophical Review 87 (3): 456. 1978.
  • Understanding the past tense
    In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: issues in philosophy and psychology, Oxford University Press. 2001.
  •  475
    Phenomenology and nonconceptual content
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3): 609-615. 2001.
    This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conc…Read more
  •  5
    Concepts and Possession Conditions
    In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
  •  1
    Thoughts : An Essay on Content, Aristotelian Society Series, vol. 4
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3): 393-393. 1988.
  •  22
    Handlungen, Gründe und Emotionen
    In Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle, De Gruyter. pp. 81-104. 2002.
  •  144
    No resting place: A critical notice of the view from nowhere
    Philosophical Review 98 (1): 65-82. 1989.
    Among the unpublished writings of Kazimierz Twardowski so far there is an essay in which Twardowski tries to embed the concept of an intentional object' within a theory that comprises at the same time psychological, logical and grammatical aspects. This theory of actions' and products' is presented here and several applications of the theory are discussed. The central question thereby is whether the distinction between actions and products enables Twardowski to counter the objection of psycholog…Read more
  •  417
    A Study of Concepts
    MIT Press. 1992.
    Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Particular concepts are also treat…Read more