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139Action: Awareness, ownership, and knowledgeIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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165Rationale and maxims in the study of conceptsNoûs 39 (1): 167-78. 2005.Is there any good reason for thinking that a concept is individuated by the condition for a thinker to possess it? Why is that approach superior to alternative accounts of the individuation of concepts? These are amongst the fundamental questions raised by Wayne Davis.
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58Discussion. The principle-based conception of modality: Sullivan's question addressedMind 107 (428): 847-850. 1998.
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94Mental Action and Self-AwarenessIn Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2023.This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a form of action-awareness. Subjects’ a…Read more
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43Principles for PossibiliaRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51 119-145. 2002.It seems to be an obvious truth that There could be something that doesn't actually exist.That is, it seems to be obiously true that ◊∃×).It is sufficient for the truth of that there could be more people, or trees, or cars, than there actually are. It is also sufficient for the truth of that there could be some pepole, or trees, or cars that are distinct from all those that actually exist. Do and suchlike statements involve a commitment to possibilia, to things that possibly exist, but do not ac…Read more
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12Can Possession Conditions Individuate Concepts?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 433-460. 1996.There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to carry the discussion forward by addressi…Read more
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30Imagination, experience, and possibilityIn John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley: a tercentennial celebration, Oxford University Press. 1985.
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1Proof and truthIn John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, representation, and projection, Oxford University Press. pp. 165--190. 1993.
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Can a theory of concepts explain the a-priori-a reply to Skorupski, John critical notice of a'study of concepts'International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1): 154-160. 1996.
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69XI*—Externalist Explanation1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1): 203-230. 1993.Christopher Peacocke; XI*—Externalist Explanation1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 203–230, https://doi.org/10.
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1Between instrumentalism and brain-writingIn Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations, Oxford University Press. 1983.
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First-person reference, representational independence, and self-knowledgeIn Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.), Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11, John Benjamins. 2001.
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124Truly understoodOxford University Press. 2008.A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case stu…Read more
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480Metaphysical necessity: Understanding, truth and epistemologyMind 106 (423): 521-574. 1997.This paper presents an account of the understanding of statements involving metaphysical modality, together with dovetailing theories of their truth conditions and epistemology. The account makes modal truth an objective matter, whilst avoiding both Lewisian modal realism and mind-dependent or expressivist treatments of the truth conditions of modal sentences. The theory proceeds by formulating constraints a world-description must meet if it is to represent a genuine possibility. Modal truth is …Read more
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16'Another I': Representing Conscious States, Perception, and OthersIn José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, reference, and experience: themes from the philosophy of Gareth Evans, Clarendon Press. 2005.What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?
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19Explaining the apri: The programme of moderate rationalismIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--285. 2000.
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8The property-identity link and its role in understandingIn Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: issues in philosophy and psychology, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--339. 2001.
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2Précis of Being Known_ _*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 636-640. 2002.The topic of Being Known is what I call the Integration Challenge, which is the challenge of providing, for any given domain, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology for that domain. In virtually every domain of thought, it is a substantive task to reconcile our metaphysics and our epistemology of that domain. In some cases, we have an intuitively acceptable metaphysics, but cannot find a plausible epistemology which would allow us knowledge of truths for which that is the right…Read more
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143Descartes DefendedAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 109-125. 2012.Drawing upon a conception of the metaphysics of conscious states and of first-person content, we can argue that Descartes's transition ‘Cogito ergo sum’ is both sound and one he is entitled to make. We can nevertheless formulate a version of Lichtenberg's objection that can still be raised after Bernard Williams's discussion. I argue that this form of Lichtenberg's revenge can also be undermined. In doing so it helps to compare the metaphysics of subjects, worlds and times. The arguments also ap…Read more
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |