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17The modality of freedomRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 349-375. 1998.The classical problem of free will is one instance of the Integration Challenge. The Integration Challenge in its general form is that of reconciling our metaphysics of any given area with our epistemology for that same area. In the case of free will, the challenge is that of reconciling our seeming first-person knowledge of our exercise of free thought, deliberation, choice and action with a description of what is really going on in the world as characterized in terms of causation, determinatio…Read more
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143Interpersonal self-consciousnessPhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 1-24. 2014.If one were to write a book titled TheVarieties of Self-Consciousness, one would start off with some distinctions. It will help to locate my topic in relation to those distinctions.The first distinction concerns that kind of self-consciousness which involves only the minimal ability on the part of a subject to self-represent, to be in mental states with first person content, be it conceptual or nonconceptual. This minimal ability involves very little as compared with the more sophisticated state…Read more
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11Perceptual contentIn J. Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan, Oxford University Press. 1989.
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35The concept of a natural numberAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1). 1998.This Article does not have an abstract
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34Wittgenstein and ExperienceRemarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I.Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume II (review)Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127): 162. 1982.
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25Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of MindPhilosophy 70 (273): 469-472. 1995.Notes on Contributors • Preface • Christopher Peacocke, Introduction: The Issues and their Further Development I OBJECTIVE THOUGHT • John Campbell, Objects and Objectivity Commentaries • Bill Brewer, Thoughts about Objects, Places and Times • John O'Keefe, Cognitive Maps, Time and Causality II OBJECTIVITY AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS • Susan Hurley, Unity and Objectivity Commentaries • Anthony Marcel, What is Relevant to the Unity of Consciousness? • Michael Lockwood, Issues of Unity and Objec…Read more
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129Sensation and the Content of Experience: A DistinctionIn Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Mit Press. pp. 341. 1997.
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102Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, InterpretationClarendon Press. 1979.INTRODUCTION The philosophy of action and the philosophy of space and time may well seem to be unconnected areas. I will argue that in each of these areas ...
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2Moralischer Rationalismus Eine erste SkizzeDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49 (2): 197-208. 2001.
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34Finiteness and the actual language relationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (n/a): 147--65. 1975.Christopher Peacocke; X*—Finiteness and the Actual Language Relation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 147–166, h.
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108Three principles of rationalismEuropean Journal of Philosophy 10 (3). 2002.It is just over fifty years since the publication of Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. That paper expresses a broad vision of the system of relations between meaning, experience, and the rational formation of belief. The deepest challenges the paper poses come not from the detailed argument of its first four sections – formidable though that is – but from the visionary material in its last two sections.1 It is this visionary material that is likely to force the reader to revise, to deepen, or …Read more
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Psychological Theories of ConceptsIn A. Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology, Oxford University Press. pp. 2--115. 1996.
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81JSTOR: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5 (May, 2001), pp. 239-264Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.T n he question posed in my title is one that has been vigorously debated in philosophy for almost twenty years now. In one form or another, the idea that perceptual experience has a content that is nonconceptual is found in the writings of, among others, Jose Bermuidez, ... \n
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18Our Entitlement to Self-KnowledgeAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1): 255-255. 1995.
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163Principles for possibiliaNoûs 36 (3). 2002.It seems to be an obvious truth that There could be something that doesn't actually exist. That is, it seems to be obiously true that ◊∃×). It is sufficient for the truth of that there could be more people, or trees, or cars, than there actually are. It is also sufficient for the truth of that there could be some pepole, or trees, or cars that are distinct from all those that actually exist. Do and suchlike statements involve a commitment to possibilia, to things that possibly exist, but do not …Read more
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140Can possession conditions individuate concepts? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 433-460. 1996.There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to carry the discussion forward by addressi…Read more
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100The limits of intelligibility: A post-verificationist proposalPhilosophical Review 97 (4): 463-496. 1988.
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39Phenomenology and Nonconceptual ContentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3): 609-615. 2001.This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly's position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation‐dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. the crucial arguments against conc…Read more
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Can a theory of concepts explain the A Priori: A reply to SkorupskiInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1): 154-60. 1996.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |