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90Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation: ArticlesBritish Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2): 189-191. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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3Argument for token identityIn Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation, Oxford University Press. 1979.
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6Reply to Humphreys, Quinlan, Higginbotham, Schiffer and Soames's comments on Peacocke's Explanation in Computational PsychologyMind and Language 1 (4): 388-402. 1986.
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3Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeploymentProceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96 117-58. 1996.
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37The principle-based conception of modality: Sullivan's question addressedMind 107 (428): 847-849. 1998.
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Introduction: The issues and their further developmentIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 1994.
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62Précis of Being Known_ _* (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 636-640. 2002.The topic of Being Known is what I call the Integration Challenge, which is the challenge of providing, for any given domain, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology for that domain. In virtually every domain of thought, it is a substantive task to reconcile our metaphysics and our epistemology of that domain. In some cases, we have an intuitively acceptable metaphysics, but cannot find a plausible epistemology which would allow us knowledge of truths for which that is the right…Read more
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75The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-ConsciousnessOxford University Press. 2014.Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives
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934Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Explanation, and PerceptionIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 357-388. 2015.I am going to argue for a robust realism about magnitudes, as irreducible elements in our ontology. This realistic attitude, I will argue, gives a better metaphysics than the alternatives. It suggests some new options in the philosophy of science. It also provides the materials for a better account of the mind’s relation to the world, in particular its perceptual relations.
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34Wittgenstein and ExperienceRemarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I.Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume II (review)Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127): 162. 1982.
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107Possession conditions: A focal point for theories of conceptsMind and Language 4 (1-2): 51-56. 1989.
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4Independence, and self-knowledge'In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, John Benjamins. pp. 30--215. 2001.
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Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of MindPhilosophical Quarterly 47 (187): 255-257. 1997.
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326Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledgeIn Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford University Press. pp. 83. 1998.What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there are c…Read more
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9Scenarios, concepts, and perceptionIn Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience, Cambridge University Press. 1992.
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2Holistic explanation: An outline of a theoryIn Rational Action, Cambridge University Press. 1979.
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2X*—Finiteness and the Actual Language RelationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1): 147-166. 1975.Christopher Peacocke; X*—Finiteness and the Actual Language Relation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 147–166, h.
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25The Perception of Music: Sources of Significance: SymposiumBritish Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3): 257-275. 2009.Representing one thing metaphorically-as something else is something that can occur in thought, imagination or perception. When a piece of music is heard as expressing some property F, some feature of the music is heard metaphorically-as F. The metaphor is exploited in the perception, rather than being represented. This account is developed and deployed to address some classical issues about music, including Wagner's point that the emotions expressed need not be those of a particular person on a…Read more
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221Mental Action and Self-AwarenessIn Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2023.This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a form of action-awareness. Subjects’ a…Read more
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138Action: Awareness, ownership, and knowledgeIn Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2003.
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164Rationale and maxims in the study of conceptsNoûs 39 (1): 167-78. 2005.Is there any good reason for thinking that a concept is individuated by the condition for a thinker to possess it? Why is that approach superior to alternative accounts of the individuation of concepts? These are amongst the fundamental questions raised by Wayne Davis.
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57Discussion. The principle-based conception of modality: Sullivan's question addressedMind 107 (428): 847-850. 1998.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |