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25'Another I': Representing Conscious States, Perception, and OthersIn Jose Luis Bermudez & José Luis Bermúdez (eds.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?
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22Handlungen, Gründe und EmotionenIn Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle, De Gruyter. pp. 81-104. 2002.
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21Representing, reasoningIn Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl & Stephen Andrew Butterfill (eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition, Oxford University Press. pp. 148. 2011.
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19I. With Reference to the Roots∗Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 21 (1-4): 105-120. 1978.
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19The a prioriIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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19Explaining the apri: The programme of moderate rationalismIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--285. 2000.
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18Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, InterpretationPhilosophical Quarterly 31 (124): 273-274. 1981.
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18Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind (edited book)British Academy. 1996.What is it to be capable of thoughts about an objective world? What is involved in the unity of consciousness? How is the ability to attribute attitudes to other persons to be understood? The three symposia in this volume develop new approaches to these central questions in the philosophy of mind. The contributors include leading philosophers of the middle and younger generation working in Britain. All the issues discussed have an interdisciplinary dimension, and each symposium contains a contri…Read more
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18Our Entitlement to Self-KnowledgeAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1): 255-255. 1995.
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17The modality of freedomRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 349-375. 1998.The classical problem of free will is one instance of the Integration Challenge. The Integration Challenge in its general form is that of reconciling our metaphysics of any given area with our epistemology for that same area. In the case of free will, the challenge is that of reconciling our seeming first-person knowledge of our exercise of free thought, deliberation, choice and action with a description of what is really going on in the world as characterized in terms of causation, determinatio…Read more
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17Précis of Being Known_ _*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 636-640. 2002.The topic of Being Known is what I call the Integration Challenge, which is the challenge of providing, for any given domain, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology for that domain. In virtually every domain of thought, it is a substantive task to reconcile our metaphysics and our epistemology of that domain. In some cases, we have an intuitively acceptable metaphysics, but cannot find a plausible epistemology which would allow us knowledge of truths for which that is the right…Read more
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16Explaining the A PrioriIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--285. 2000.
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1511 Theories of Concepts: A Wider TaskIn João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 157. 2001.
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15Mental action and self-awareness : EpistemologyIn Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions, Oxford University Press. 2009.Book description: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. * Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind * Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates * A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored * Organized into three sections which …Read more
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14Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their RelationsPhilosophical Quarterly 36 (143): 278-291. 1986.
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14Mental action and self-awareness : epistemologyIn Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions, Oxford University Press. 2009.This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a form of action-awareness. Subjects’ a…Read more
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12HolismIn Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley. 2017.The question must arise whether a doctrine which is attributed to all of Quine, Putnam, Davidson, Rorty, Gadamer, and Heidegger is possibly a doctrine which comes in more than one version. Even the most ardent taxonomist is likely to draw back from classifying the various actual and possible positions which emerge from the very tangled history of recent discussions of holism. This chapter approaches the matter by addressing a series of questions, starting with those which are most likely to aris…Read more
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12Can Possession Conditions Individuate Concepts?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 433-460. 1996.There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to carry the discussion forward by addressi…Read more
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |