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9Realm of ReasonOxford University Press UK. 2003.The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of cont…Read more
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9Scenarios, concepts, and perceptionIn Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience, Cambridge University Press. 1992.
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9The Inaugural Address: Analogue ContentAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1): 1-18. 1986.
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8Distinguishing the specific from the recognitional and the canonical, and the nature of ratiosBehavioral and Brain Sciences 44. 2021.There are three independent properties of a mode of presentation of a number: being specific; being recognitional; and being canonical. A perceptual m.p. of the form that many Fs is specific although it is neither recognitional nor canonical. The literature has not distinguished noncanonical from nonspecific m.p.s of numbers. Ratios are fundamentally ratios of magnitudes.
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8The Principle‐Based Account of Modality: Elucidations and ResourcesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 663-679. 2002.In their searching contributions to this Symposium, Gideon Rosen, Timothy Williamson and Crispin Wright identify a set of issues crucial for assessing the principle-based treatment of modality I presented in Chapter Four of Being Known. I thank them for such focused and thoughtful discussions. This response is organized as a series of questions and proposed answers that aim to address the issues they raise. I hope their contributions will be as helpful to the reader as they have been to me in un…Read more
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8The property-identity link and its role in understandingIn Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--339. 2001.
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7Concepts without wordsIn Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--33. 1997.
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6Reply to Humphreys, Quinlan, Higginbotham, Schiffer and Soames's comments on Peacocke's Explanation in Computational PsychologyMind and Language 1 (4): 388-402. 1986.
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5Concepts and Possession ConditionsIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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5Rule-following: The nature of Wittgenstein's argumentsIn S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, Routledge. pp. 72--95. 1981.
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4Independence, and self-knowledge'In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, John Benjamins. pp. 30--215. 2001.
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3Argument for token identityIn Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation, Oxford University Press. 1979.
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3Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeploymentProceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96 117-58. 1996.
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2Moralischer Rationalismus Eine erste SkizzeDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49 (2): 197-208. 2001.
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2Understanding and Sense (edited book)Dartmouth Pub Co. 1993.Part of the international Research Library of Philosophy, which collects in book form, a range of influential essays in philosophy, drawn predominantly from English-language journals. Each volume in the library deals with a field of inquiry which has received significant attention in philosophy in the last 25 years and is edited by a philosopher noted in that field.
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2Holistic explanation: An outline of a theoryIn Rational Action, Cambridge University Press. 1979.
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2X*—Finiteness and the Actual Language RelationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1): 147-166. 1975.Christopher Peacocke; X*—Finiteness and the Actual Language Relation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 147–166, h.
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2A selective bibliography of philosophical logicSub-faculty of Philosophy [University of Oxford]. 1978.
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1Thoughts : An Essay on Content, Aristotelian Society Series, vol. 4Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3): 393-393. 1988.
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1How is logical inference possible?In Brian Andrew Ball & Christoph Schuringa (eds.), The Act and Object of Judgment: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives, Routledge. 2019.
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1Perception and the first personIn Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |