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80First person illusions: Are they Descartes', or Kant's?Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 247-275. 2012.
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141The realm of reasonOxford University Press. 2004.The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of cont…Read more
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249ObjectivityMind 118 (471): 739-769. 2009.Judgement, perception, and other mental states and events have a minimal objectivity in this sense: making the judgement or being in the mental state does not in general thereby make the judgement correct or make the perception veridical. I offer an explanation of this minimal objectivity by developing a form of constitutive transcendental argument. The argument appeals to the proper individuation of the content of judgements and perceptions. In the case of the conceptual content of judgements, …Read more
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6Reply to Humphreys, Quinlan, Higginbotham, Schiffer and Soames's comments on Peacocke's Explanation in Computational PsychologyMind and Language 1 (4): 388-402. 1986.
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3Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeploymentProceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96 117-58. 1996.
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37The principle-based conception of modality: Sullivan's question addressedMind 107 (428): 847-849. 1998.
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96Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation: ArticlesBritish Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2): 189-191. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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2Understanding and Sense (edited book)Dartmouth Pub Co. 1993.Part of the international Research Library of Philosophy, which collects in book form, a range of influential essays in philosophy, drawn predominantly from English-language journals. Each volume in the library deals with a field of inquiry which has received significant attention in philosophy in the last 25 years and is edited by a philosopher noted in that field.
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3Argument for token identityIn Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation, Clarendon Press. 1979.
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63Précis of Being Known_ _* (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 636-640. 2002.The topic of Being Known is what I call the Integration Challenge, which is the challenge of providing, for any given domain, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology for that domain. In virtually every domain of thought, it is a substantive task to reconcile our metaphysics and our epistemology of that domain. In some cases, we have an intuitively acceptable metaphysics, but cannot find a plausible epistemology which would allow us knowledge of truths for which that is the right…Read more
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75The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-ConsciousnessOxford University Press. 2014.Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives
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Introduction: The issues and their further developmentIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 1994.
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4Independence, and self-knowledge'In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, John Benjamins. pp. 30--215. 2001.
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964Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Explanation, and PerceptionIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 357-388. 2015.I am going to argue for a robust realism about magnitudes, as irreducible elements in our ontology. This realistic attitude, I will argue, gives a better metaphysics than the alternatives. It suggests some new options in the philosophy of science. It also provides the materials for a better account of the mind’s relation to the world, in particular its perceptual relations.
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107Possession conditions: A focal point for theories of conceptsMind and Language 4 (1-2): 51-56. 1989.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |