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Introduction: The issues and their further developmentIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 1994.
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109Possession conditions: A focal point for theories of conceptsMind and Language 4 (1-2): 51-56. 1989.
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4Independence, and self-knowledge'In Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.), Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11, John Benjamins. pp. 30--215. 2001.
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972Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Explanation, and PerceptionIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 357-388. 2015.I am going to argue for a robust realism about magnitudes, as irreducible elements in our ontology. This realistic attitude, I will argue, gives a better metaphysics than the alternatives. It suggests some new options in the philosophy of science. It also provides the materials for a better account of the mind’s relation to the world, in particular its perceptual relations.
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1When is a grammar psychologically realIn Noam Chomsky & Alexander George (eds.), Reflections on Chomsky, Blackwell. pp. 111--130. 1989.
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330Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledgeIn C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 83. 1998.What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there are c…Read more
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10Scenarios, concepts, and perceptionIn Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), The Contents of Experience, Cambridge University Press. 1992.
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2Holistic explanation: An outline of a theoryIn Rational Action, Cambridge University Press. 1979.
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Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of MindPhilosophical Quarterly 47 (187): 255-257. 1997.
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2X*—Finiteness and the Actual Language RelationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1): 147-166. 1975.Christopher Peacocke; X*—Finiteness and the Actual Language Relation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 147–166, h.
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20The Perception of Music: Sources of Significance: SymposiumBritish Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3): 257-275. 2009.Representing one thing metaphorically-as something else is something that can occur in thought, imagination or perception. When a piece of music is heard as expressing some property F, some feature of the music is heard metaphorically-as F. The metaphor is exploited in the perception, rather than being represented. This account is developed and deployed to address some classical issues about music, including Wagner's point that the emotions expressed need not be those of a particular person on a…Read more
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161Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2). 2010.where F is a contradiction (I use his numbering). Tim says about these equivalences: (1) “modulo the implicit recognition of this equivalence, the epistemology of metaphysically modal thinking is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking. Whoever has what it takes to understand the counterfactual conditional and the elementary logical auxiliaries ~ and F has what it takes to understand possibility and necessity operators.” (158) (2) The idea that we evaluate metaphysically mo…Read more
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165Rationale and maxims in the study of conceptsNoûs 39 (1): 167-78. 2005.Is there any good reason for thinking that a concept is individuated by the condition for a thinker to possess it? Why is that approach superior to alternative accounts of the individuation of concepts? These are amongst the fundamental questions raised by Wayne Davis.
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58Discussion. The principle-based conception of modality: Sullivan's question addressedMind 107 (428): 847-850. 1998.
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94Mental Action and Self-AwarenessIn Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2023.This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a form of action-awareness. Subjects’ a…Read more
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139Action: Awareness, ownership, and knowledgeIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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43Principles for PossibiliaRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51 119-145. 2002.It seems to be an obvious truth that There could be something that doesn't actually exist.That is, it seems to be obiously true that ◊∃×).It is sufficient for the truth of that there could be more people, or trees, or cars, than there actually are. It is also sufficient for the truth of that there could be some pepole, or trees, or cars that are distinct from all those that actually exist. Do and suchlike statements involve a commitment to possibilia, to things that possibly exist, but do not ac…Read more
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12Can Possession Conditions Individuate Concepts?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 433-460. 1996.There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to carry the discussion forward by addressi…Read more
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30Imagination, experience, and possibilityIn John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley: a tercentennial celebration, Oxford University Press. 1985.
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1Proof and truthIn John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, representation, and projection, Oxford University Press. pp. 165--190. 1993.
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Can a theory of concepts explain the a-priori-a reply to Skorupski, John critical notice of a'study of concepts'International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1): 154-160. 1996.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |