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2Moralischer Rationalismus Eine erste SkizzeDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49 (2): 197-208. 2001.
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Psychological Theories of ConceptsIn A. Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology, Oxford University Press. pp. 2--115. 1996.
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81JSTOR: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5 (May, 2001), pp. 239-264Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.T n he question posed in my title is one that has been vigorously debated in philosophy for almost twenty years now. In one form or another, the idea that perceptual experience has a content that is nonconceptual is found in the writings of, among others, Jose Bermuidez, ... \n
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162Principles for possibiliaNoûs 36 (3). 2002.It seems to be an obvious truth that There could be something that doesn't actually exist. That is, it seems to be obiously true that ◊∃×). It is sufficient for the truth of that there could be more people, or trees, or cars, than there actually are. It is also sufficient for the truth of that there could be some pepole, or trees, or cars that are distinct from all those that actually exist. Do and suchlike statements involve a commitment to possibilia, to things that possibly exist, but do not …Read more
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140Can possession conditions individuate concepts? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 433-460. 1996.There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to carry the discussion forward by addressi…Read more
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100The limits of intelligibility: A post-verificationist proposalPhilosophical Review 97 (4): 463-496. 1988.
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16Our Entitlement to Self-KnowledgeAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1): 255-255. 1995.
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Can a theory of concepts explain the A Priori: A reply to SkorupskiInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1): 154-60. 1996.
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39Phenomenology and Nonconceptual ContentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3): 609-615. 2001.This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly's position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation‐dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. the crucial arguments against conc…Read more
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1When is a grammar psychologically realIn A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky, Blackwell. pp. 111--130. 1989.
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77First person illusions: Are they Descartes', or Kant's?Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 247-275. 2012.
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138The realm of reasonOxford University Press. 2004.The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of cont…Read more
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245ObjectivityMind 118 (471): 739-769. 2009.Judgement, perception, and other mental states and events have a minimal objectivity in this sense: making the judgement or being in the mental state does not in general thereby make the judgement correct or make the perception veridical. I offer an explanation of this minimal objectivity by developing a form of constitutive transcendental argument. The argument appeals to the proper individuation of the content of judgements and perceptions. In the case of the conceptual content of judgements, …Read more
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6Reply to Humphreys, Quinlan, Higginbotham, Schiffer and Soames's comments on Peacocke's Explanation in Computational PsychologyMind and Language 1 (4): 388-402. 1986.
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161Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2). 2010.where F is a contradiction (I use his numbering). Tim says about these equivalences: (1) “modulo the implicit recognition of this equivalence, the epistemology of metaphysically modal thinking is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking. Whoever has what it takes to understand the counterfactual conditional and the elementary logical auxiliaries ~ and F has what it takes to understand possibility and necessity operators.” (158) (2) The idea that we evaluate metaphysically mo…Read more
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3Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeploymentProceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96 117-58. 1996.
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37The principle-based conception of modality: Sullivan's question addressedMind 107 (428): 847-849. 1998.
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89Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation: ArticlesBritish Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2): 189-191. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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3Argument for token identityIn Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation, Oxford University Press. 1979.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |