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222Sensational properties: Theses to accept and theses to rejectRevue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1): 7-24. 2008.The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conce…Read more
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18Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, InterpretationPhilosophical Quarterly 31 (124): 273-274. 1981.
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Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of ConsciousnessRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (1): 112-113. 1997.
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1Content and norms in a natural worldIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
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36Frege's hierarchy: a puzzleIn Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford University Press. pp. 159. 2010.
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366The Perception of Music: Sources of SignificanceModern Schoolman 86 (3-4): 239-260. 2009.We can experience music as sad, as exuberant, as sombre. We can experience it as expressing immensity, identification with the rest of humanity, or gratitude. The foundational question of what it is for music to express these or anything else is easily asked; and it has proved extraordinarily difficult to answer satisfactorily. The question of what it is for emotion or other states to be heard in music is not the causal or computational question of how it comes to be heard. It is not the questio…Read more
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Understanding the past tenseIn Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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314Nonconceptual content defended (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 381-388. 1998.
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1A selective bibliography of philosophical logicSub-faculty of Philosophy [University of Oxford]. 1978.
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50Self-ConsciousnessRevue de Métaphysique et de Morale 72 (4): 521-551. 2011.Résumé Je distingue deux variétés de conscience de soi. J ’ appelle la première “ conscience de soi perspective ”. Je rends compte de sa nature et j ’ analyse sa relation aux éléments suivants: le test du miroir de Gallup; l ’ immunité à l ’ erreur d ’ identification selon Shoemaker; la possession par le sujet conscient de l ’ idée d ’ une pluralité d ’ esprits; et quelques-unes des idées de Sartre sur ce que c ’ est que se concevoir soi-même comme objet. J ’ appelle “ conscience de soi réflexiv…Read more
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95Experiencing Metaphorically-As in Music Perception: Clarifications and Commitments: SymposiumBritish Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3): 299-306. 2009.
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109The principle-based account of modality: Elucidations and resources (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3). 2002.In their searching contributions to this Symposium, Gideon Rosen, Timothy Williamson and Crispin Wright identify a set of issues crucial for assessing the principle-based treatment of modality I presented in Chapter Four of Being Known. I thank them for such focused and thoughtful discussions. This response is organized as a series of questions and proposed answers that aim to address the issues they raise. I hope their contributions will be as helpful to the reader as they have been to me in un…Read more
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78Mental action and self-awareness : epistemologyIn Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions, Oxford University Press. 2009.We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
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An Appendix to David Wiggins'" Note"In Gareth Evans & John Henry McDowell (eds.), Truth and meaning: essays in semantics, Clarendon Press. pp. 313--324. 1976.
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Reply : Rule-followingIn Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, Routledge. 1981.
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1Intuitive mechanics, psychological reality and the idea of a material objectIn Naomi M. Eilan (ed.), Spatial representation: problems in philosophy and psychology, Blackwell. pp. 162--76. 1993.
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19I. With Reference to the Roots∗Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 21 (1-4): 105-120. 1978.
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1Understanding Logical Constants: A Realist's AccountIn Peacocke Christopher (ed.), Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 73: 1987, . pp. 153. 1988.
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7Concepts without wordsIn Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--33. 1997.
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19The a prioriIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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1Intention and akrasiaIn Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson, Oxford University Press. pp. 69. 1985.
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86Perception, Biology, Action, and KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2): 477-484. 2014.
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1Free willIn Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press. 1998.
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Understanding and rule-followingIn Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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56Our entitlement to self-knowledge: Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeploymentProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 117-58. 1996.Tyler Burge, Christopher Peacocke; Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 117–158, h.
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157Being knownOxford University Press. 1999.Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |