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153Are Perceptions Reached by Rational Inference? Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of PerceptionRes Philosophica 95 (4): 751-760. 2018.
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1B. Referate uber fremdsprachige Neuerscheinungen-The Realm of ReasoriPhilosophischer Literaturanzeiger 59 (3): 330. 2006.
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107Discussion of Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 425. 1996.Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts is a dense and rewarding work. Each chapter raises many issues for discussion. I know three different people who are writing reviews of the volume. It testifies to the depth of Peacocke’s book that each reviewer is focusing on a quite different set of topics.
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74Précis of A Study of Concepts (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 407. 1996.The principal thesis of A Study of Concepts is that a concept is individuated by its possession condition. Concepts are here understood to be sliced as finely as epistemic possibility. So now and 6 o’clock are different concepts, even if, in context, they pick out the same time; likewise for the observational concept circular and the complex concept locus of coplanar points equidistant from a given point. In the simplest cases, a possession condition is stated by giving a true, individuating sta…Read more
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119Computation as Involving Content: A Response to EganMind and Language 14 (2): 195-202. 1999.Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They…Read more
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181Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and StructureMind and Language 19 (1): 85-98. 2004.This paper has five theses, which are intended to address the claims in Jerry Fodor's paper. (1) The question arises of the relation between the philosophical theory of concepts and epistemology. Neither is explanatorily prior to the other. Rather, each relies implicitly on distinctions drawn from the other. To explain what makes something knowledge, we need distinctions drawn from the theory of concepts. To explain the attitudes mentioned in a theory of concepts, we need to use the notion of kn…Read more
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146Non‐conceptual Content_: _Kinds, Rationales and RelationsMind and Language 9 (4): 419-430. 1994.
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14Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their RelationsPhilosophical Quarterly 36 (143): 278-291. 1986.
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22Handlungen, Gründe und EmotionenIn Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle, De Gruyter. pp. 81-104. 2002.
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475Phenomenology and nonconceptual contentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3): 609-615. 2001.This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conc…Read more
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5Concepts and Possession ConditionsIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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1Thoughts : An Essay on Content, Aristotelian Society Series, vol. 4Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3): 393-393. 1988.
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The relation between philosophical and psychological theories of conceptsIn Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought, Oxford University Press. 1996.
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144No resting place: A critical notice of the view from nowherePhilosophical Review 98 (1): 65-82. 1989.Among the unpublished writings of Kazimierz Twardowski so far there is an essay in which Twardowski tries to embed the concept of an intentional object' within a theory that comprises at the same time psychological, logical and grammatical aspects. This theory of actions' and products' is presented here and several applications of the theory are discussed. The central question thereby is whether the distinction between actions and products enables Twardowski to counter the objection of psycholog…Read more
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417A Study of ConceptsMIT Press. 1992.Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Particular concepts are also treat…Read more
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319Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their RelationsOxford University Press. 1983.Introduction This book is about the nature of the content of psychological states. Examples of psychological states with content are: believing today is a ...
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |