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153Are Perceptions Reached by Rational Inference? Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of PerceptionRes Philosophica 95 (4): 751-760. 2018.
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1B. Referate uber fremdsprachige Neuerscheinungen-The Realm of ReasoriPhilosophischer Literaturanzeiger 59 (3): 330. 2006.
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107Discussion of Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 425. 1996.Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts is a dense and rewarding work. Each chapter raises many issues for discussion. I know three different people who are writing reviews of the volume. It testifies to the depth of Peacocke’s book that each reviewer is focusing on a quite different set of topics.
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74Précis of A Study of Concepts (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 407. 1996.The principal thesis of A Study of Concepts is that a concept is individuated by its possession condition. Concepts are here understood to be sliced as finely as epistemic possibility. So now and 6 o’clock are different concepts, even if, in context, they pick out the same time; likewise for the observational concept circular and the complex concept locus of coplanar points equidistant from a given point. In the simplest cases, a possession condition is stated by giving a true, individuating sta…Read more
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119Computation as Involving Content: A Response to EganMind and Language 14 (2): 195-202. 1999.Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They…Read more
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181Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and StructureMind and Language 19 (1): 85-98. 2004.This paper has five theses, which are intended to address the claims in Jerry Fodor's paper. (1) The question arises of the relation between the philosophical theory of concepts and epistemology. Neither is explanatorily prior to the other. Rather, each relies implicitly on distinctions drawn from the other. To explain what makes something knowledge, we need distinctions drawn from the theory of concepts. To explain the attitudes mentioned in a theory of concepts, we need to use the notion of kn…Read more
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146Non‐conceptual Content_: _Kinds, Rationales and RelationsMind and Language 9 (4): 419-430. 1994.
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14Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their RelationsPhilosophical Quarterly 36 (143): 278-291. 1986.
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132Understanding logical constants: A realist's accountIn T. J. Smiley & Thomas Baldwin (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge, Published For the British Academy By Oxford University Press. pp. 163. 2004.
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18Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind (edited book)British Academy. 1996.What is it to be capable of thoughts about an objective world? What is involved in the unity of consciousness? How is the ability to attribute attitudes to other persons to be understood? The three symposia in this volume develop new approaches to these central questions in the philosophy of mind. The contributors include leading philosophers of the middle and younger generation working in Britain. All the issues discussed have an interdisciplinary dimension, and each symposium contains a contri…Read more
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1Free willIn Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press. 1998.
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Understanding and rule-followingIn Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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56Our entitlement to self-knowledge: Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeploymentProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 117-58. 1996.Tyler Burge, Christopher Peacocke; Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 117–158, h.
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157Being knownOxford University Press. 1999.Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.
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5Rule-following: The nature of Wittgenstein's argumentsIn S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, Routledge. pp. 72--95. 1981.
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16Explaining the A PrioriIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--285. 2000.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |