Christopher Peacocke

Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
  • Columbia University
    Department of Philosophy
    Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy
  • Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
    Other (Part-time)
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil
New York City, New York, United States of America
  •  44
    Précis of A Study of Concepts (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 407. 1996.
    The principal thesis of A Study of Concepts is that a concept is individuated by its possession condition. Concepts are here understood to be sliced as finely as epistemic possibility. So now and 6 o’clock are different concepts, even if, in context, they pick out the same time; likewise for the observational concept circular and the complex concept locus of coplanar points equidistant from a given point. In the simplest cases, a possession condition is stated by giving a true, individuating sta…Read more
  •  10
    Thoughts: An Essay on Content
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1): 178-180. 1988.
  •  41
    Computation as Involving Content: A Response to Egan
    Mind and Language 14 (2): 195-202. 1999.
    Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They…Read more
  •  69
    Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure
    Mind and Language 19 (1): 85-98. 2004.
    This paper has five theses, which are intended to address the claims in Jerry Fodor's paper. (1) The question arises of the relation between the philosophical theory of concepts and epistemology. Neither is explanatorily prior to the other. Rather, each relies implicitly on distinctions drawn from the other. To explain what makes something knowledge, we need distinctions drawn from the theory of concepts. To explain the attitudes mentioned in a theory of concepts, we need to use the notion of kn…Read more
  •  14
    Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations
    Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143): 278-291. 1986.
  •  26
    Christopher Peacocke, The Realm of Reason (review)
    Philosophical Review 115 (2): 243-246. 2006.
  •  16
    Being Known
    Mind 110 (440): 1105-1109. 2001.
  •  20
    New Essays on the A Priori
    Mind 111 (443): 647-652. 2002.
  •  16
    Thoughts: An Essay on Content
    Philosophy of Science 56 (2): 359-360. 1989.
  •  74
    How Are A Priori Truths Possible?1
    European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2): 175-199. 1993.
  •  17
    Theories of Concepts: A Wider Task
    European Journal of Philosophy 8 (3): 298-321. 2000.
  •  5
    Three Principles of Rationalism
    European Journal of Philosophy 10 (3): 375-397. 2002.
  •  4
    Reply to Papineau
    Philosophical Books 28 (1): 9-14. 1987.
  •  35
    Finiteness and the actual language relation
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (n/a): 147--65. 1975.
    Christopher Peacocke; X*—Finiteness and the Actual Language Relation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 147–166, h.
  •  108
    Three principles of rationalism
    European Journal of Philosophy 10 (3). 2002.
    It is just over fifty years since the publication of Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. That paper expresses a broad vision of the system of relations between meaning, experience, and the rational formation of belief. The deepest challenges the paper poses come not from the detailed argument of its first four sections – formidable though that is – but from the visionary material in its last two sections.1 It is this visionary material that is likely to force the reader to revise, to deepen, or …Read more
  •  3
    Moralischer Rationalismus Eine erste Skizze
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49 (2): 197-208. 2001.
  •  48
    What Are Concepts?
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1): 1-28. 1989.
  •  109
    Theories of concepts: A Wider task
    European Journal of Philosophy 8 (3): 298-321. 2000.
  •  81
    T n he question posed in my title is one that has been vigorously debated in philosophy for almost twenty years now. In one form or another, the idea that perceptual experience has a content that is nonconceptual is found in the writings of, among others, Jose Bermuidez, ... \n
  •  204
    Deviant Causal Chains
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1). 1979.
  • Psychological Theories of Concepts
    In Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Oxford University Press. pp. 2--115. 1996.
  •  140
    Can possession conditions individuate concepts? (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 433-460. 1996.
    There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to carry the discussion forward by addressi…Read more
  •  100
    The limits of intelligibility: A post-verificationist proposal
    Philosophical Review 97 (4): 463-496. 1988.
  •  18
    Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1): 255-255. 1995.