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2Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2). 2010.where F is a contradiction (I use his numbering). Tim says about these equivalences: (1) “modulo the implicit recognition of this equivalence, the epistemology of metaphysically modal thinking is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking. Whoever has what it takes to understand the counterfactual conditional and the elementary logical auxiliaries ~ and F has what it takes to understand possibility and necessity operators.” (158) (2) The idea that we evaluate metaphysically mo…Read more
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5Rule-following: The nature of Wittgenstein's argumentsIn Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, Routledge. pp. 72--95. 1981.
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16Explaining the A PrioriIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--285. 2000.
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9Justification, realism and the pastMind 114 (455): 639-670. 2005.This paper begins by considering Dummett's justificationist treatment of statements about the past in his book Truth and the Past (2004). Contrary to Dummett's position, there is no way of applying the intuitionistic distinction in the arithmetical case between direct and indirect methods of establishing a content to the case of past-tense statements. Attempts to do so either give the wrong truth conditions, or rely on notions not available to a justificationist position. A better, realistic tre…Read more
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1511 Theories of Concepts: A Wider TaskIn João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 157. 2001.
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185Our Entitlement to Self-KnowledgeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 91-116. 1996.Tyler Burge, Christopher Peacocke; Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 91–116, ht.
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9Conceiving of Conscious StatesIn Jonathan Ellis & Daniel Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2012.For a wide range of concepts, a thinker’s understanding of what it is for a thing to fall under the concept plausibly involves knowledge of an identity. It involves knowledge that the thing has to have the same property as is exemplified in instantiation of the concept in some distinguished, basic instance. This paper addresses the question: can we apply this general model of the role of identity in understanding to the case of subjective, conscious states? In particular, can we explain our unde…Read more
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22Implicit conceptions, understanding, and rationalityIn Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Mit Press. pp. 43-88. 2003.
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15Phenomenology and nonconceptual contentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3): 609-615. 2001.This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conc…Read more
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5Concepts and Possession ConditionsIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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1Thoughts : An Essay on Content, Aristotelian Society Series, vol. 4Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3): 393-393. 1988.
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22Handlungen, Gründe und EmotionenIn Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle, De Gruyter. pp. 81-104. 2002.
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20No resting place: A critical notice of the view from nowherePhilosophical Review 98 (1): 65-82. 1989.Among the unpublished writings of Kazimierz Twardowski so far there is an essay in which Twardowski tries to embed the concept of an intentional object' within a theory that comprises at the same time psychological, logical and grammatical aspects. This theory of actions' and products' is presented here and several applications of the theory are discussed. The central question thereby is whether the distinction between actions and products enables Twardowski to counter the objection of psycholog…Read more
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36Wittgenstein and ExperienceRemarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I.Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume II (review)Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127): 162. 1982.
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21A Study of ConceptsMIT Press. 1992.Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Particular concepts are also treat…Read more
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21Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their RelationsOxford University Press. 1983.Introduction This book is about the nature of the content of psychological states. Examples of psychological states with content are: believing today is a ...
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The relation between philosophical and psychological theories of conceptsIn Peter Millican & Andy Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Oxford University Press. 1996.
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1Means and explanation in epistemology (review)Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237): 730-737. 2009.No Abstract
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4Anchoring conceptual content: Scenarios and perceptionIn Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy, Norwell: Kluwer. pp. 293--322. 1992.
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21Representing, reasoningIn Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl & Stephen Butterfill (eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition, Oxford University Press. pp. 148. 2011.
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9Explaining perceptual entitlementIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 441--80. 2004.material that was later incorporated into The Realm of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and into a paper of the same title in The Challenge of Externalism, ed. R. Schantz (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004)
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |