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34Wittgenstein and ExperienceRemarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I.Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume II (review)Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127): 162. 1982.
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17The modality of freedomRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 349-375. 1998.The classical problem of free will is one instance of the Integration Challenge. The Integration Challenge in its general form is that of reconciling our metaphysics of any given area with our epistemology for that same area. In the case of free will, the challenge is that of reconciling our seeming first-person knowledge of our exercise of free thought, deliberation, choice and action with a description of what is really going on in the world as characterized in terms of causation, determinatio…Read more
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143Interpersonal self-consciousnessPhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 1-24. 2014.If one were to write a book titled TheVarieties of Self-Consciousness, one would start off with some distinctions. It will help to locate my topic in relation to those distinctions.The first distinction concerns that kind of self-consciousness which involves only the minimal ability on the part of a subject to self-represent, to be in mental states with first person content, be it conceptual or nonconceptual. This minimal ability involves very little as compared with the more sophisticated state…Read more
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44Rationality, Norms and the Primitively Compelling: A Reply to Kirk LudwigMind and Language 9 (4): 492-498. 1994.
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118Precis of a study of concepts (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 407-52. 1996.The principal thesis of A Study of Concepts is that a concept is individuated by its possession condition. Concepts are here understood to be sliced as finely as epistemic possibility. So now and 6 o’clock are different concepts, even if, in context, they pick out the same time; likewise for the observational concept circular and the complex concept locus of coplanar points equidistant from a given point. In the simplest cases, a possession condition is stated by giving a true, individuating sta…Read more
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |