-
1Proof and truthIn John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, representation, and projection, Oxford University Press. pp. 165--190. 1993.
-
First-person reference, representational independence, and self-knowledgeIn Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.), Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11, John Benjamins. 2001.
-
124Truly understoodOxford University Press. 2008.A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case stu…Read more
-
1Between instrumentalism and brain-writingIn Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations, Oxford University Press. 1983.
-
19Explaining the apri: The programme of moderate rationalismIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--285. 2000.
-
8The property-identity link and its role in understandingIn Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: issues in philosophy and psychology, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--339. 2001.
-
480Metaphysical necessity: Understanding, truth and epistemologyMind 106 (423): 521-574. 1997.This paper presents an account of the understanding of statements involving metaphysical modality, together with dovetailing theories of their truth conditions and epistemology. The account makes modal truth an objective matter, whilst avoiding both Lewisian modal realism and mind-dependent or expressivist treatments of the truth conditions of modal sentences. The theory proceeds by formulating constraints a world-description must meet if it is to represent a genuine possibility. Modal truth is …Read more
-
16'Another I': Representing Conscious States, Perception, and OthersIn José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, reference, and experience: themes from the philosophy of Gareth Evans, Clarendon Press. 2005.What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?
-
143Descartes DefendedAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 109-125. 2012.Drawing upon a conception of the metaphysics of conscious states and of first-person content, we can argue that Descartes's transition ‘Cogito ergo sum’ is both sound and one he is entitled to make. We can nevertheless formulate a version of Lichtenberg's objection that can still be raised after Bernard Williams's discussion. I argue that this form of Lichtenberg's revenge can also be undermined. In doing so it helps to compare the metaphysics of subjects, worlds and times. The arguments also ap…Read more
-
212Joint attention: Its nature, reflexivity, and relation to common knowledgeIn Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 298-324. 2005.The openness of joint awareness between two or more subjects is a perceptual phenomenon. It involves a certain mutual awareness between the subjects, an awareness that makes reference to that very awareness itself. Properly characterized, such awareness can generate iterated awareness ‘x is aware that y is aware that x is aware...’ to whatever level the subjects can sustain. The openness should not be characterized in terms of Lewis–Schiffer common knowledge, the conditions for which are not met…Read more
-
17Précis of Being Known_ _*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 636-640. 2002.The topic of Being Known is what I call the Integration Challenge, which is the challenge of providing, for any given domain, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology for that domain. In virtually every domain of thought, it is a substantive task to reconcile our metaphysics and our epistemology of that domain. In some cases, we have an intuitively acceptable metaphysics, but cannot find a plausible epistemology which would allow us knowledge of truths for which that is the right…Read more
-
10The Inaugural Address: Analogue ContentAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1): 1-18. 1986.
-
154Implicit conceptions, the "a priori," and the identity of conceptsPhilosophical Issues 9 121-148. 1998.
-
270New Essays on the A Priori (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2000.A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
-
180Perception, Content and Rationality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2). 2009.Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience is a stylish and stimulating contribution to our subject. My expectation is that those who disagree with some of its central theses will, like me, learn greatly from thinking through where and why they part company with Gupta's lucidly presented position. For the purposes of a Symposium, I select three points of disagreement. Each point in one way or another concerns the epistemic role of the content of experience.
-
Understanding the past tenseIn Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: issues in philosophy and psychology, Oxford University Press. 2001.
-
222Sensational properties: Theses to accept and theses to rejectRevue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1): 7-24. 2008.The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conce…Read more
-
18Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, InterpretationPhilosophical Quarterly 31 (124): 273-274. 1981.
-
Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of ConsciousnessRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (1): 112-113. 1997.
-
1Content and norms in a natural worldIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
-
48Self-ConsciousnessRevue de Métaphysique et de Morale 72 (4): 521-551. 2011.Résumé Je distingue deux variétés de conscience de soi. J ’ appelle la première “ conscience de soi perspective ”. Je rends compte de sa nature et j ’ analyse sa relation aux éléments suivants: le test du miroir de Gallup; l ’ immunité à l ’ erreur d ’ identification selon Shoemaker; la possession par le sujet conscient de l ’ idée d ’ une pluralité d ’ esprits; et quelques-unes des idées de Sartre sur ce que c ’ est que se concevoir soi-même comme objet. J ’ appelle “ conscience de soi réflexiv…Read more
-
37Frege's hierarchy: a puzzleIn Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford University Press. pp. 159. 2010.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
-
-
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |