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18Our Entitlement to Self-KnowledgeAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1): 255-255. 1995.
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163Principles for possibiliaNoûs 36 (3). 2002.It seems to be an obvious truth that There could be something that doesn't actually exist. That is, it seems to be obiously true that ◊∃×). It is sufficient for the truth of that there could be more people, or trees, or cars, than there actually are. It is also sufficient for the truth of that there could be some pepole, or trees, or cars that are distinct from all those that actually exist. Do and suchlike statements involve a commitment to possibilia, to things that possibly exist, but do not …Read more
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142Can possession conditions individuate concepts? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 433-460. 1996.There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to carry the discussion forward by addressi…Read more
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34Phenomenology and Nonconceptual ContentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3): 609-615. 2001.This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly's position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation‐dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. the crucial arguments against conc…Read more
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Can a theory of concepts explain the A Priori: A reply to SkorupskiInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1): 154-60. 1996.
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80First person illusions: Are they Descartes', or Kant's?Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 247-275. 2012.
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138The realm of reasonOxford University Press. 2004.The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of cont…Read more
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50ObjectivityMind 118 (471): 739-769. 2009.Judgement, perception, and other mental states and events have a minimal objectivity in this sense: making the judgement or being in the mental state does not in general thereby make the judgement correct or make the perception veridical. I offer an explanation of this minimal objectivity by developing a form of constitutive transcendental argument. The argument appeals to the proper individuation of the content of judgements and perceptions. In the case of the conceptual content of judgements, …Read more
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132Understanding logical constants: A realist's accountIn T. J. Smiley & Thomas Baldwin (eds.), Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge, Published For the British Academy By Oxford University Press. pp. 163. 2004.
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3Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeploymentProceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96 117-58. 1996.
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37The principle-based conception of modality: Sullivan's question addressedMind 107 (428): 847-849. 1998.
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31Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation: ArticlesBritish Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2): 189-191. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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3Argument for token identityIn Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation, Clarendon Press. 1979.
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6Reply to Humphreys, Quinlan, Higginbotham, Schiffer and Soames's comments on Peacocke's Explanation in Computational PsychologyMind and Language 1 (4): 388-402. 1986.
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75The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-ConsciousnessOxford University Press. 2014.Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives
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Introduction: The issues and their further developmentIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 1994.
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29Précis of Being Known_ _* (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 636-640. 2002.The topic of Being Known is what I call the Integration Challenge, which is the challenge of providing, for any given domain, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics and epistemology for that domain. In virtually every domain of thought, it is a substantive task to reconcile our metaphysics and our epistemology of that domain. In some cases, we have an intuitively acceptable metaphysics, but cannot find a plausible epistemology which would allow us knowledge of truths for which that is the right…Read more
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4Independence, and self-knowledge'In Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.), Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11, John Benjamins. pp. 30--215. 2001.
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972Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Explanation, and PerceptionIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 357-388. 2015.I am going to argue for a robust realism about magnitudes, as irreducible elements in our ontology. This realistic attitude, I will argue, gives a better metaphysics than the alternatives. It suggests some new options in the philosophy of science. It also provides the materials for a better account of the mind’s relation to the world, in particular its perceptual relations.
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109Possession conditions: A focal point for theories of conceptsMind and Language 4 (1-2): 51-56. 1989.
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10Scenarios, concepts, and perceptionIn Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), The Contents of Experience, Cambridge University Press. 1992.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |