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108Three principles of rationalismEuropean Journal of Philosophy 10 (3). 2002.It is just over fifty years since the publication of Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. That paper expresses a broad vision of the system of relations between meaning, experience, and the rational formation of belief. The deepest challenges the paper poses come not from the detailed argument of its first four sections – formidable though that is – but from the visionary material in its last two sections.1 It is this visionary material that is likely to force the reader to revise, to deepen, or …Read more
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3Moralischer Rationalismus Eine erste SkizzeDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49 (2): 197-208. 2001.
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36Finiteness and the actual language relationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (n/a): 147--65. 1975.Christopher Peacocke; X*—Finiteness and the Actual Language Relation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 147–166, h.
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81JSTOR: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5 (May, 2001), pp. 239-264Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.T n he question posed in my title is one that has been vigorously debated in philosophy for almost twenty years now. In one form or another, the idea that perceptual experience has a content that is nonconceptual is found in the writings of, among others, Jose Bermuidez, ... \n
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Psychological Theories of ConceptsIn Andy Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Oxford University Press. pp. 2--115. 1996.
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18Our Entitlement to Self-KnowledgeAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1): 255-255. 1995.
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163Principles for possibiliaNoûs 36 (3). 2002.It seems to be an obvious truth that There could be something that doesn't actually exist. That is, it seems to be obiously true that ◊∃×). It is sufficient for the truth of that there could be more people, or trees, or cars, than there actually are. It is also sufficient for the truth of that there could be some pepole, or trees, or cars that are distinct from all those that actually exist. Do and suchlike statements involve a commitment to possibilia, to things that possibly exist, but do not …Read more
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142Can possession conditions individuate concepts? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 433-460. 1996.There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to carry the discussion forward by addressi…Read more
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100The limits of intelligibility: A post-verificationist proposalPhilosophical Review 97 (4): 463-496. 1988.
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34Phenomenology and Nonconceptual ContentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3): 609-615. 2001.This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly's position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation‐dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. the crucial arguments against conc…Read more
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Can a theory of concepts explain the A Priori: A reply to SkorupskiInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1): 154-60. 1996.
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138The realm of reasonOxford University Press. 2004.The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of cont…Read more
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50ObjectivityMind 118 (471): 739-769. 2009.Judgement, perception, and other mental states and events have a minimal objectivity in this sense: making the judgement or being in the mental state does not in general thereby make the judgement correct or make the perception veridical. I offer an explanation of this minimal objectivity by developing a form of constitutive transcendental argument. The argument appeals to the proper individuation of the content of judgements and perceptions. In the case of the conceptual content of judgements, …Read more
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80First person illusions: Are they Descartes', or Kant's?Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 247-275. 2012.
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132Understanding logical constants: A realist's accountIn T. J. Smiley & Thomas Baldwin (eds.), Studies in the philosophy of logic and knowledge, Published For the British Academy By Oxford University Press. pp. 163. 2004.
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31Music and Experiencing Metaphorically-As: Further Delineation: ArticlesBritish Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2): 189-191. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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3Argument for token identityIn Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation, Clarendon Press. 1979.
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6Reply to Humphreys, Quinlan, Higginbotham, Schiffer and Soames's comments on Peacocke's Explanation in Computational PsychologyMind and Language 1 (4): 388-402. 1986.
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3Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeploymentProceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96 117-58. 1996.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |