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153Are Perceptions Reached by Rational Inference? Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of PerceptionRes Philosophica 95 (4): 751-760. 2018.
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1B. Referate uber fremdsprachige Neuerscheinungen-The Realm of ReasoriPhilosophischer Literaturanzeiger 59 (3): 330. 2006.
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107Discussion of Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 425. 1996.Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts is a dense and rewarding work. Each chapter raises many issues for discussion. I know three different people who are writing reviews of the volume. It testifies to the depth of Peacocke’s book that each reviewer is focusing on a quite different set of topics.
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74Précis of A Study of Concepts (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 407. 1996.The principal thesis of A Study of Concepts is that a concept is individuated by its possession condition. Concepts are here understood to be sliced as finely as epistemic possibility. So now and 6 o’clock are different concepts, even if, in context, they pick out the same time; likewise for the observational concept circular and the complex concept locus of coplanar points equidistant from a given point. In the simplest cases, a possession condition is stated by giving a true, individuating sta…Read more
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119Computation as Involving Content: A Response to EganMind and Language 14 (2): 195-202. 1999.Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They…Read more
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181Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and StructureMind and Language 19 (1): 85-98. 2004.This paper has five theses, which are intended to address the claims in Jerry Fodor's paper. (1) The question arises of the relation between the philosophical theory of concepts and epistemology. Neither is explanatorily prior to the other. Rather, each relies implicitly on distinctions drawn from the other. To explain what makes something knowledge, we need distinctions drawn from the theory of concepts. To explain the attitudes mentioned in a theory of concepts, we need to use the notion of kn…Read more
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146Non‐conceptual Content_: _Kinds, Rationales and RelationsMind and Language 9 (4): 419-430. 1994.
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14Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their RelationsPhilosophical Quarterly 36 (143): 278-291. 1986.
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332New Essays on the A Priori (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2000.A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
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180Perception, Content and Rationality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2). 2009.Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience is a stylish and stimulating contribution to our subject. My expectation is that those who disagree with some of its central theses will, like me, learn greatly from thinking through where and why they part company with Gupta's lucidly presented position. For the purposes of a Symposium, I select three points of disagreement. Each point in one way or another concerns the epistemic role of the content of experience.
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9The Inaugural Address: Analogue ContentAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1): 1-18. 1986.
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152Implicit conceptions, the "a priori," and the identity of conceptsPhilosophical Issues 9 121-148. 1998.
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Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of ConsciousnessRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (1): 112-113. 1997.
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1Content and norms in a natural worldIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
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222Sensational properties: Theses to accept and theses to rejectRevue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1): 7-24. 2008.The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conce…Read more
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18Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, InterpretationPhilosophical Quarterly 31 (124): 273-274. 1981.
Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
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Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonOther (Part-time)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |