Michelle Kosch

The dissertation traces the approach to the problem of free will---in particular, the question of whether moral evil can be freely chosen---from Kant through Schelling to Kierkegaard. The goal is to clarify the historical transition from German idealism to the first version of existential philosophy, by showing the philosophical concerns of the latter to be implicit in unresolved problems in the former. I begin by examining Kant's attempt to reconcile what is essentially an incompatibilist notion of free will with the claims of theoretical objectivity, and show that the only argument for the reality of human freedom this reconciliation allows him to give is one that connects freedom altogether too strongly with practical reason, threatening to render moral evil not simply irrational, but actually impossible. I then trace the development of Schelling's account of freedom, showing that the transformation in his view marked by the Freedom Essay of 1809 is motivated primarily by the goal of overcoming this difficulty in Kant's account. In his later work, I argue, Schelling's aim is to articulate a theory of knowledge consistent with this account of freedom. I then interpret Kierkegaard's critique of what he calls the "esthetic" and the "immanent ethical" standpoints and his account of the meta-ethical status of Christianity in light of this development. I argue that the standard interpretations of these aspects of Kierkegaard's position are mistaken, and that Kierkegaard's philosophical debt to Schelling has been seriously underestimated. His account of human agency as it is presented in The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death is founded upon the account presented by Schelling in the Freedom Essay, and his critique of idealist epistemology is based upon the position laid out in Schelling's late work. Finally, I contrast Schelling's and Kierkegaard's positive accounts of theoretical and moral objectivity, and point to some difficulties in Kierkegaard's view