Richard Joyce

A version of moral fictionalism is presented and defended, modeled on Coleridge’s “suspension of disbelief” and Mill’s solution to the paradox of happiness. The key observation is that sometimes, in order to achieve our goals, we must come at them obliquely—practicing “self-distraction.” This, it is argued, is the case with our Humean values: “in order to get them, one must forget them” (as Sidgwick put it). More specifically, in order to satisfy these non-moral goals we must dress them in a Kantian moral veneer, which renders our judgments false but also more practically efficacious. After this version of moral fictionalism is defended, the question is posed whether similar arguments might support religious fictionalism. Kant’s “moral hazard argument” for religious fictionalism is discussed. Ultimately, it is argued that ambitious religious fictionalism faces challenges that don’t arise for a comparably ambitious moral fictionalism.

This paper addresses the "paradox of fiction," which questions how individuals can experience genuine emotions, such as fear, in response to fictional entities like monsters, given that they do not believe these entities exist. I critique Colin Radford's view that such emotional responses are irrational, proposing instead that emotions should be evaluated through the lens of practical rationality. I argue that engaging with fiction to elicit emotions can be a rational act if it serves the individual's purposes, such as enhancing enjoyment or fostering empathy. I suggest that emotions in response to fiction can contribute to rational action by educating our sensibilities, thereby supporting the idea that such emotional responses are not inherently irrational.

We make moral judgments about all sorts of things, both mundane and momentous. But are any of these moral judgments actually true? The moral error theorist argues that they are not. According to this view, when people make moral judgments (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong”) although they purport to say true things about the world, in fact the world does not contain any of the properties or relations that would be necessary to render such judgments true. Nothing is morally right; nothing is morally wrong. The first part of this book (“Morality in Error”) argues in favor of this version of moral skepticism. Moral properties, it is claimed, have features that cannot be accommodated within the naturalistic worldview. Some of these problematic features pertain to the “reason-giving” nature of moral properties; some pertain to puzzles surrounding the notion of moral responsibility. Suppose that we decided that this radical skepticism about morality is correct — what, then, should we do with our faulty moral discourse? The abolitionist presents the most obvious answer: that we should just do away with morality (in the way that in the past we eliminated talk of bodily humors, say). The fictionalist presents a less obvious answer: that we should retain moral discourse even though we know (at some level) that it is false. The second part of this book (“Morality as Fiction”) advocates an ambitious version of moral fictionalism. This book is a sequel to the author’s 2001 work "The Myth of Morality."

This paper investigates the origins of human moral judgment, focusing on whether it is a biological adaptation and the implications for ethical inquiry. It contrasts moral nativism, which treats moral judgment as an evolved adaptation, with spandrel theory, which views it as a byproduct of other cognitive and affective mechanisms. I emphasize the difficulty of empirically distinguishing adaptations from byproducts, noting that speculation about ancestral selective pressures is unavoidable. Comparing human moral capacities with nonhuman primates, I argue that while affective mechanisms such as empathy and reciprocity form the “building blocks” of morality, fully-fledged moral judgment requires cognitive capacities, including beliefs about obligation, desert, and transgression. The paper proposes that the human brain may be predisposed to normative cognition, though moral content is learned and culturally variable. Finally, I consider the metaethical implications of this view, highlighting that moral beliefs (unlike most other evolved traits) can be evaluated for truth and justification.

It is widely believed that the Divine Command Theory is untenable due to the Euthyphro Dilemma. This article first examines the Platonic dialogue of that name, and shows that Socrates’s reasoning is faulty. Second, the dilemma in the form in which many contemporary philosophers accept it is examined in detail, and this reasoning is also shown to be deficient. This is not to say, however, that the Divine Command Theory is true—merely that one popular argument for rejecting it is unsound. Finally, some brief thoughts are presented concerning where the real problems lie for the theory.

This paper examines Descartes’ distinction between two forms of memory—corporeal and intellectual—referenced more in his correspondence than in his published works. I address two central, intertwined questions: (1) What is the nature of Descartes’ intellectual memory? and (2) Why, having established corporeal memory, did he deem it necessary to have intellectual memory as well? The first part of the article reconstructs Descartes’ conception of corporeal memory—showing how he viewed memory as mechanistic, functionally attainable by soulless machines. This sets the stage for the core question: Why posit a second, intellectual memory? Though empirical considerations offer some considerations in favor of an answer, I argue that the real motivation lies in Descartes’ rationalist epistemological framework.

This paper examines the prospects of moral fictionalism as a response to error theory, distinguishing between hermeneutic and revolutionary approaches. Hermeneutic fictionalism interprets our actual moral discourse as akin to engagement with fiction: cognitivist versions treat moral judgments as truth-apt statements about a fictional moral world, while noncognitivist versions construe them as acts of make-believe, avoiding ontological commitment. Revolutionary fictionalism, by contrast, treats moral discourse as actually false but pragmatically useful, recommending that we adopt a fictional stance toward morality to retain its motivational and social benefits. In order to clarify fictionalism I explore an analogy with metaphor, which is a familiar linguistic practice that enables speakers to communicate important truths even if the surface claim is false.

This paper examines the philosophical and practical dimensions of apologies, with particular attention to collective and representative cases. I begin by situating contemporary high-profile apologies—by heads of state, religious leaders, and institutions—within the broader context of “the Age of Apologizing,” noting the challenges posed when the apologizer has not personally committed the wrong. I argue that individuals can legitimately apologize on behalf of a group if they act as authorized representatives, whether for extant or defunct groups, emphasizing that authority may derive from institutional or socially recognized mechanisms rather than personal involvement. I show that apologies need not depend on genuine personal remorse: an apology may succeed as a speech act even if insincere, provided it acknowledges wrongdoing and expresses regret or responsibility on behalf of the relevant agent. The paper also addresses the social function of apologies, highlighting their forward-looking purpose in reconciliation and harm repair.

This paper explores the compatibility and coexistence of moral naturalism and moral skepticism as legitimate metaethical positions. The central argument is that these are not mutually exclusive adversaries, but potentially undecidable metaethical options. Drawing on philosophical precedents—including David Lewis’s reflections on indeterminacy between naturalism and error theory, and Rudolf Carnap’s openness to rival interpretations—I explore an attitude of metaethical ambivalence: one that recognizes that both moral naturalism and skepticism remain reasonable and permissible alternatives.

This paper traces the resurgence of evolutionary ethics, which lay dormant since Darwin’s era and Herbert Spencer’s early speculations, until a late-20th-century revival sparked vigorous philosophical debate. I highlight three central Darwinian theses with potential ethical significance: (1) humans are the product of natural selection; (2) humans are inherently social organisms shaped by that process; and (3) humans possess an innate moral sense forged by evolution. While the first two are largely uncontested, I critically scrutinize the claim of moral nativism, questioning whether moral judgment reflects a specialized evolutionary adaptation or emerges from cultural learning rooted in broader psychological traits.

This paper critically examines Mackie’s concept of moral objectification, the idea that the sense of moral prescriptions being “objective” stems from our tendency to project emotional attitudes onto external situations—a move rooted in Humean projectivism. I argue that Mackie needs this thesis as a supplementary bridge to bolster his primary skeptical arguments—namely, the arguments from moral relativity and from queerness. These foundational arguments alone, I contend, fail to fully dispel our strong intuitions in favor of morality unless supported by an explanation of how such intuitions arise. I conclude that while the thesis of objectification plays a critical role in Mackie’s overall case for metaethical skepticism, it remains inadequately supported.

In his contribution to this volume, Paul Bloomfield analyzes and attempts to answer the question “Why is it bad to be bad?” I too use this question as my point of departure; in particular I approach the matter from the perspective of a moral error theorist. This discussion prefaces one of the principal topics of this paper: the relationship between morality and self-interest. Again, my main goal is to clarify what the moral error theorist might say on this subject. Against this background, the final portion of this paper is a discussion of moral fictionalism, defending it from some objections.

According to the moral error theorist, all moral judgments are mistaken. The world just doesn't contain the properties and relations necessary for these judgments to be true. But what should we actually do if we decided that we are in this radical and unsettling predicament--that morality is just a widespread and heartfelt illusion? One suggestion is to eliminate all talk and thought of morality. Another is to carry on believing it anyway. And yet another is to treat morality as a kind of convenient fiction. We tend to think of moral thinking as valuable and useful, but we can also recognize that it can be harmful and even disastrous. Would we be better off or worse off if we stopped basing decisions on moral considerations? This is a collection of twelve brand new chapters focused on a critical examination of the options available to the moral error theorist. After a general introduction outlining the topic, explaining key terminology, and offering suggestions for further reading, the chapters address questions like: * Is it true that the more that people are motivated by moral concerns, the more likely it is that society will be elitist, authoritarian, and dishonest? * Is an appeal to moral values a useful tool for helping resolve conflicts, or does it actually exacerbate conflicts? * Would it even be possible to abolish morality from our thinking? * If we were to accept a moral error theory, would it be feasible to carry on believing in morality in everyday contexts? * Might moral discourse be usefully modeled on familiar metaphorical language, where we can convey useful and important truths by uttering falsehoods? * Does moral thinking support or undermine a commitment to feminist goals? * What role do moral judgments play in addressing important decisions affecting climate change? The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriouslyis the first book to thoroughly address these and other questions, systematically investigating the harms and benefits of moral thought, and considering what the world might be like without morality.

This paper interrogates the common belief that Hume advocates an expressivist position through his so-called Motivation Argument. While popularly understood as an expressivist, Hume’s metaethical commitments are actually deeply ambiguous—ranging variously from expressivism to moral skepticism, dispositional theory, ideal observer theory, or cognitivist subjectivism. I express skepticism that Hume should be simply labeled an expressivist, arguing that such an interpretation lacks convincing textual grounding. Most of the chapter pivots away from textual exegesis to focus on the Motivation Argument itself. I critically assess whether this argument successfully supports expressivism, ultimately finding that it does not. I then propose a hybrid metaethical position that melds elements of traditional expressivism with cognitivism. In closing, the paper tentatively entertains whether such a hybrid might align with Hume’s views, though I admit that this interpretation is speculative and not vigorously defended.